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ABSTRACT
Afghanistan is emerging from more than two decades of conflict, capped by a
severe nationwide drought in 1999-2001, and faces a complex, interrelated set of
political, administrative, economic, and social challenge. The objective of this study was
to analyze Afghanistan’s human development based on specific criteria such as economic
inequality and poverty, corruption, public health and most specifically children and
women’s health. This thesis identifies Afghanistan’s challenges and impediments to
development and state-building in the past nine years. I further argue that Afghanistan
was successful in economic and public health matters due to the institutions that were
built at the national, regional and local levels with a somewhat structured cooperation.
International organizations, NGOs and Western states who are involvement in the
development of Afghanistan each want to dominate and lead the reconstruction and this
creates an even more chaotic and un-manageable situation. This paper starts with a
background description of Afghanistan followed by specific reasons as to why the
international sphere should focus on rebuilding and securing Afghanistan.
Finally, I discuss on how to address the existing challenges facing Afghanistan by
incorporating the lessons learned from the past 9 years of development.
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Afghanistan has been in the news for the past couple of years; its issues have become a
centripetal theme to the presidency of two American presidents, and the headlines of the
first decade of the 21st century. The main issues of Afghanistan that affects the entire
international community are: Terrorism, narcotics and its geopolitical map in the near
east. Much work has been done to develop Afghanistan after the 2001 U.S led invasion,
however, today Afghanistan still faces many of the same challenges it faced almost a
decade ago. In this research, I will try to identify the impediments to development and
state-building in the past nine years in Afghanistan and identify a methodology to
overcome the development and stability roadblocks that Afghanistan faces today. I will
analyze the success and failures of Afghanistan’s economic and public health
development. For my hypothesis I will argue that institutions must be developed at the
national, regional, and local levels and a structured cooperation among them will advance
the development process in Afghanistan. I anticipate to find why is it what are the factors
that improved Afghanistan’s economy and its public health and why is that other field do
not prosper as well. I will base my arguments on the following theories: Complex
Interdependence Theory, Constructivism and Dependency Theory. In the thesis, I will
delve into more detail as to: 1) why Afghanistan and its development are crucial to the
international community, 2) what has been an imperative to its development in the last
decade, 3) what can be done to fix this problem 4) how to applying various international
relation theories combined with the past experiences and the views of Afghanistan
experts to solving these problems.
Afghanistan is emerging from more than two decades of conflict, capped by a
severe nation-wide drought in 1999-2001, and faces a complex, interrelated set of
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political, administrative, economic, and social challenges. The government leadership is
politically, financially and militarily supported by the international community. This
support has borne fruit in the form of rapid economic growth, rising incomes, initial
revival of public administration, and other improvements.1 Despite these gains,
Afghanistan remains among the poorest countries in the world (average yearly per capita
GDP of around US$300 including opium), and it is a highly fragmented society where
the authority of the government is contested.2
Continuation of recent positive development is subject to serious risks: political,
security, drug-related, macroeconomic, institutional, and climatic. More than 20 years of
conflict in Afghanistan resulted in the collapse of the national state as a legitimate
political entity with monopoly over the legitimate use of force. After the US-led invasion
of Afghanistan, the international community had no other choice than to start a statebuilding agenda including: creating political organizations, improvements in security,
administrative capacity-building, and other key components. What we mean by building
a state is one that can protect rights, provide services, and promote security; it requires a
number of interdependent processes. At a minimum these includes:
i. Demobilizing and dissolving all armed forces not controlled by the state.
ii. Forming and training armed forces and police to protect international and domestic
security in accordance with law.
iii. Forming and training all components of a legal system, from legislators to judges and
prosecutors, to provide a legal framework for the functioning of the state and other social
relations.3
iv. Raising revenue in accordance with law to pay for the functioning of the state.
1

Afghanistan State Building, Sustaining Growth, and Reducing Poverty A Country Economic Report,
Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit South Asia Region September 9, 2004, Report
No. 29551-AF, Document of the World Bank
2
Ibid. p.xi
3
Afghanistan State Building, Sustaining Growth, and Reducing Poverty A Country Economic Report,
Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit South Asia Region September 9, 2004, Report
No. 29551-AF, Document of the World Bank, p. 31
5

v. Creating and training an administration capable of raising revenue and providing
services to citizens and other inhabitants.
vi. State- building and nation building after a post conflict recovery is the most
challenging concern for Afghanistan, multiple requirement need to occur in order to keep
itself together as a state.4
Just like those living in any other poor country, the Afghan people want their
state, economy and society to function and they know that the current dysfunctional state
stands between them and a better life. In order to understand the struggle of the Afghan
people it is important to recapitulate the early years of the Taliban regime because of the
events that occurred then, which effectively shaped the difficulties that the Afghans have
to face today. In the 1990s, especially in the last years of the Taliban Regime, little
humanitarian aid flew to Afghanistan, which was problematic. The U.N, Red Cross and a
handful of NGO relief agencies kept millions of Afghans alive with food supplies and ran
the few hospitals and schools that still functioned. Nearly one million Afghans were
displaced inside the country, and a new flow of refugees was arriving in Pakistan and
Iran. The Taliban had no concern for the public, nor any sense of responsibility toward
them, rather, they created roadblocks for the UN, determined to make it as difficult as
possible for international agencies to operate there.5 Just before the attack of 9/11 the
entire international aid program for keeping millions of Afghans alive was on the verge
of collapse and a humanitarian and political crisis was clearly brewing. After the
American invasion, the Afghan people’s living situation deteriorated and the international
community’s job to help stabilize the country became more difficult.

4

Afghanistan State Building, Sustaining Growth, and Reducing Poverty A Country Economic Report,
Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit South Asia Region September 9, 2004, Report
No. 29551-AF, Document of the World Bank, p. 31

5

Rashid. Ahmad, Descent into chaos: The U.S and the disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia.
New York, p, 172
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Why Afghanistan matters?
The issue of nation-building in Afghanistan is important because the failure to
maintain basic order not only makes fear a constant part of daily life for Afghans, but
also provides a breeding ground for a small minority to perpetuate criminality and terror.
As 9/11 and subsequent attacks showed, people in prosperous countries can no longer
take the security of their daily lives for granted. This problem, failed states, is at the heart
of a worldwide systemic crisis that constitutes the most serious challenges to global
stability in the new millennium. Slowly but surely, politicians, generals and business
leaders are beginning to realize that we must arrest and reverse state failure. Politicians
now understand that issues such as refugee flows and humanitarian action have their
roots in the failure of states to provide basic opportunities for their citizens.6 Security
organizations recognize that crumbling states are at the root of ongoing conflicts,
terrorism, and expanding networks of criminality that traffic in drugs, arms and people.7
Development institutions are beginning to discover that an effective state is the necessary
condition for eradicating poverty.8 And corporations have come to comprehend that
market stability and growth stem from strong institutions everywhere, not just in the
countries where they do business. A consensus is now emerging that only a sovereign
state, by which we mean a state that actually performs the functions that make them
sovereign will allow human progress to continue.9
If we want to stop international terrorism, we need to pay more attention to failed
states, because groups involved with terrorism, criminality, arms and narcotics thrive and
6

Ghani, Ashraf, Lockhart Clare, Fixing Failed States, A Framework For Rebuilding A Fractured World.
Oxford University Press, p. 4
7
Ibid. p.4
8
Ibid.
9

Ibid.
7

fester in areas of misrule. Some of the international responses to Afghanistan’s insecurity
problems have been counterproductive because often the issues surrounding the problems
are complex, and quick impact tasks do not address the nature of the problems; using
atavistic, haphazard, fragmented, and short-term responses that sometimes exacerbate the
collection of problems we set out to fix.10 The first impulse has been on use force. But we
have reached the limits to the use of force, since the war in Afghanistan has not been
successful. This insight was articulated in the 18th century by thinkers as diverse as JeanJacques Rousseau and Edmund Burke.
In 1762 in the Social Contract, Rousseau wrote that the “strongest is never strong
enough to be always master, unless he transforms strength into right, and obedience into
duty.11 Similarly, Burke in his 1775 Speech of Moving Resolutions for Conciliation with
the Colonies argues, “the use of force alone is but temporary. It may subdue for a
moment, but it does not remove the necessity of subduing again: and a nation is not
governed, which is perpetually to be conquered.12 Despite the presence of NATO and
coalition forces, as well as massive infusions of aid, Afghanistan has become the largest
producer of heroin in the world and a perpetual nightmare of violence, and a bedrock for
terrorism and criminal activity. Henceforth, it is of the essence to properly address this
problem and also gain from these lessons so that they could be applied to other failed
state scenarios.

10

Ghani, p. 5
Rennie, Ruth. State building, security, and social change in Afghanistan, Reflections on a Survey of the
Afghan People, The Asia Foundation, Kabul, Afghanistan. p. 17
12
Ibid. p. 17
11
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Research questions will touch upon
The following are a set of questions I would like to concentrate on in my research.
What does nation-building mean for Afghanistan, and what needs to be done after 9 years
of trying? What are the lessons learned in the reconstruction of Afghanistan and how is it
possible to repair the failure of these previous reconstruction strategies? What should the
United States do in order to promote a sustainable nation-building plan? Is it the United
States’ or NATO’s responsibility to rebuild a post-conflict nation regardless of what their
role was in the 2001 invasion?
Would the nation-building lessons learned in Afghanistan be helpful in other
failed states in the world such as Somalia? What strategic theory can tell us about the
“successes” and “failures” of NATO and the U.S? Are the failures seen in Afghanistan
due to the Iraq invasion?
What needs to be done by different organizations in Afghanistan, UN, Red Cross, NGO,
and NATO? What do different scholars say about how to operate in nation building in
Afghanistan? What are some of the best resolutions to the problem that Afghanistan is
presently facing? How could we overcome poverty and instability in Afghanistan? And
how can we apply various international relations theories to answering such questions
and formulating a proper solution to the development issues in Afghanistan?

9

Identifying the problem and Approaches to solving it:
As the nation-building experiment in Afghanistan approaches its ninth year,
progress remains with very mixed results. Until recently, the lessons to be learned have
been mostly negative, but important policy adjustments along the way, especially those
made by the United States reveal a picture that is more positive.13 Although serious
challenges remain, tremendous successes have been achieved across the whole spectrum
of nation-building efforts, from security and humanitarian relief to physical and economic
reconstruction and state building. Both the successes and the failures merit careful
analysis. But success is far from certain. Serious challenges remain, that if inequitably
met, could cause the whole project of Afghan nation-building to founder.
We all agree that global poverty is intolerable; we attempt to deal with it by using
mechanisms developed fifty years ago that result only in disenchantment and mutual
recrimination without many significant breakthroughs in wealth creation. In addition,
there are very few Afghan specialists within the U.S government after the American
disengagement from the region following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in
1989. How can an effective political strategy, be developed in the absence of country
expertise?
Nevertheless, some dedicated NGOs remained on the ground after the US
withdrawal in 1989. New strategic mechanisms that have been developed by these
different dedicated NGOs need to be taken more seriously and given a chance to be
applied. On the other hand some business NGOs were often required to cater to the

13

Fukuyama, F. ed. Michele A. Flournoy, Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 2006, chapter 7 Lessons of Nation-building in Afghanistan, p. 146
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desires of local commanders, who used them for support within their patronage network.
These practices often led to poor resource distribution and outright corruption.14 Many
NGOs were not accountable, which resulted in subterfuge by some widespread distrust
by many. In the coming years the arrival of new and inexperienced organizations led to
violent incidents and wasted resources. Their operations contradicted either national or
local strategies for political reconstruction, they needed to be less biased and needed to
include the local people in their procedures. Registering NGOs is a first step; fostering a
code of conduct for operations in Afghanistan can also help.15 But there are dangers in
actually requiring NGOs to be licensed for their activities, which can either unnecessarily
limit good works or turn licensing into a new form of corruption for authorizing
officers.16 There is a balance to be struck between the need for operational space for
effectiveness and accountability to ensure legitimacy of action.17
I believe that in order for Afghanistan to undergo successful nation-building,
several significant challenges would need to be met. These would be the provision of
security, relief of displaced populations, rehabilitation of the economy and accompanying
reconstruction of infrastructure, and state-building. Another major impediment to
Afghanistan’s developmental and reconstruction program is related to its imposed politics
and a lack of preparation and understanding of both Afghanistan and international actors,
mostly the United States. The United States had no clear strategy for long-term
stabilization, state building and development, which caused tremendous delays and are
now pressing challenges to recapture the wasted time and resources. Also, Afghanistan
14

Their, Alexander. Chopra, Jarat. The Road Ahead , Political and institutional reconstruction of
Afghanistan, Third World Quarterly, Vol 23, No 5, p. 897
15
Ibid. p. 897
16
Ibid. p. 897
17
Ibid. p. 899
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was a target and concern within the context of counterterrorism, not humanitarianism.18
It is commonly known that security and reconstruction are two sides of the same coin.
Mutually reinforcing progress on one front is necessary on the other and therefore the
first priority should be to bring security to the everyday lives of Afghans. Afghan people
cannot put their lives on hold until the U.S is done capturing Al-Qaeda group leaders
according to its counterterrorism program. This creates impatience and problems,
because some desperate farmers or young unemployed civilians are being tempted to join
the Taliban who pay them. Since they are not presented with another alternative, and they
have to make ends meet, they are inclined to join. Therefore, it is of imperative
importance to have reconstruction and security work in unison.
Early strategic mistakes shaped Afghanistan on the ground and constrained later
choices. Deep flaws in U.S strategy also occurred due to institutional incapacity within
the U.S government for nation-building, and the George Bush administration’s initial
reluctance to make nation-building in Afghanistan a priority. The United States think
tank RAND calculated that a minimum investment of $100 per capita is needed to
stabilize a country coming out of conflict. Bosnia received $ 679 per capita, Kosovo
$576, and East Timor $233, Afghanistan received only $ 57 per capita in the first two
years after 2001.19
There is also a need to work on persuading other countries to assume more
significant roles despite continued rifts between them, mostly by the Chinese government
who neighbors Afghanistan to its north. There is a lot of developmental opportunity that

18

Ayub, Fatima. Kouvo, Sari, Righting the course? Humanitarian intervention, the war on terror and the
future of Afghanistan, International Affairs, 84:4, p. 641.
19
Report of the High-level panel set up by UN secretary-general, “Threats, Challenges and Changes,”
December 2004, p, 183
12

both sides could take advantage of, e.g. Afghanistan hosts a profitable network of
international trade routes. The legendary Karakoram highway that links China and
Pakistan could pierce through the mighty Hindu Kush.20 There is an urgent need to
rebuild key roads between the major cities and link them to neighboring countries so that
aid would flow. Roads and railways of Afghanistan could greatly facilitate trade among
the countries of central, west and south Asia, and far beyond and they can promote
ancillary industries. Upon the foundation of a sound economy will arise a superstructure
of polity and society.21
The Afghan economy is based on its agriculture; therefore, it is understandable
that a good crop cycle would revive public morale in the countryside and convince people
of the worthlessness of the Taliban. Millions of returning refugees would be encouraged
to return to their villages rather than gravitate to the cities looking for work. Agriculture
would provide jobs to the militiamen who would soon be demobilized and offer farmers
alternatives to growing opium poppies, a business that was certain to boom again.22
Another setback to combat poverty is the tardiness in financial support by the
international community; since the Afghanistan economy is fragile it needs a steady
injection of money. However, many countries have failing aid bureaucracies that took
months to identify projects, more months to disburse the money, and then had nobody on
the ground to monitor implementation. The United States was blighted with the same
problems, where at the end of the war the CIA, U.S Department of Defense (DOD), U.S
Special Operation Force, the State Department, and USAID, were carrying out quick-

20

Sau, Ranjit, Reconstruction of Afghanistan into a Modern Nation, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol.
37, No.2 (Jan.12-18, 2002), p. 120.
21
Ibid. p. 120
22
Rashid. p. 190
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impact projects and humanitarian relief all with their separate budgets and staff. There
was no central aid coordinator for the U.S government’s efforts and zero coordination
with the U.N, European allies, or the Afghan government. Quick-impact projects were
swift and cheap, such as digging a well, rebuilding a small bridge, or repairing a brokendown school building and were supposed to convince the population that reconstruction
was moving ahead. All Western donors speak of “building capacity” in the weak Afghan
government.23 In a failed state such as Afghanistan, capacity would take years of patience
and hard work to build. In the meantime, donors undermined their own efforts by funding
programs that would benefit the population without consulting the relevant ministry for
their aid. It was tempting to do it yourself rather than spend years training Afghan
officials.24 As we have observed, this will lead to more complicated problems as many
Afghans get armed (police) or equipped without knowing how to operate as an
institution, allowing other institutions, such as the Taliban, to take advantage and control
the lack of proper governmental institutions.
The issue of funding was addressed in a major donor’s conference for
Afghanistan that took place in Tokyo. The donors concluded that it would take $ 12.2
billion over five years to “rebuild” Afghanistan.25 A trust fund was established, but
donors did not give in any money. In the next two years most of the funds pledged at
Tokyo were to be spent on humanitarian relief rather then real reconstruction projects.26
The United States said it would take the lead in building the new army; Britain would
take charge of counter-narcotics; Italy would rebuild the justice system; Japan would

23

Rashid, p. 177
Ibid.
25
Ibid. p. 180
26
Ibid.
24
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disarm the militias; while Germany would rebuild the police force.27 Their plans
floundered due to lack of coordination, overlapping projects, and resulted in a waste of
funds.
Also the U.S and U.N needed to settle ground on who is going to do what and
keep to their pledges. Due to the fact that important programs needed to be delicately
dealt with through coordination, it was key to maintain proper coordination, however that
failed. For example, in a program called Disarmament, Demobilization, and
Reintegration (DDR), UNAMA (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) was
responsible for collecting heavy weapons from the warlords, such as tanks and artillery
and prepared for disarming some one hundred thousand militias.28 DDR programs have
become an essential part of peacemaking and nation building around the world, but the
United States put up major obstacles, refusing to fund or support DDR or allow U.S
troops to help the UN carry out disarmament.29 On the other hand, Lakhdar Brahimi
(Special Adviser to the Secretary-General) stressed that training the Afghan National
Army (ANA) had to run parallel to disarming the militias but the pentagon refused to
help in this task.30 The United States however was recruiting militiamen to protect its
bases, thereby increasing militia numbers even as the UN was trying to disarm them,
henceforth, leading to an obstruction in achieving disarmament.31
The United States and a few other countries did take serious responsibility
towards the new Afghan army, with expenditures on the ANA for 2004 at $797 million
which rose to $830 million in 2005-2006. ANA then numbered 37, 000 men and with the
27

Rashid. p. 179
Ibid.
29
Ibid. p. 205
30
Ibid. p. 202
31
Ibid. p. 205
28
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help of NATO was able to deploy counter insurgencies in major Taliban areas. Today the
major issue is how to sustain the army, which at full strength will have a recurrent cost of
$1billion a year.32
Training a police force proved to be far more cumbersome. The UN had
determined that rebuilding the police force in a failed states is even more important that
rebuilding an army.33 The police are on the front line of public security, law and order
and extending the writ of government.34 The Afghan national police was not rebuilt from
scratch as the army was and the government recruited corrupt police officers from the
warlords.35 The Germans who were tasked with training a new Afghan police force were
unwilling to provide sufficient resources and training at which point Washington decided
to take over police training in 2003, with interminable delays. The State Department had
given DynCorp $24 million to set up seven regional training centers across Afghanistan.
DynCorp was training the police to fight an insurgency rather than win hearts and minds
in their localities.36
In short, my policy proposals are: 1) attention must be made to the proposals and
plans of NGOs who were present in Afghanistan prior to the US invasion. 2) Focus needs
to be on re-building Afghanistan’s economy, security forces and the reconstruction of its
infrastructure. Of key importance is to rebuild its roads and rail infrastructure so that
trade could be facilitated between neighboring countries. 3) Encouragement of other
neighboring countries, in particular, China to invest in Afghanistan’s development.

32

Rashid. p. 205
Ibid. p. 206
34
Ibid. p. 206
35
Reforming the Afghan National Police, A joint report of the Royal United Services Institute for Defense
and Security Studies (London) and the Foreign Policy Research Institute (Philadelphia), 2005, p, 36
36
Rashid. p. 205
33
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4) Facilitation of farmers and Afghani agriculture with the needs to produce viable
products instead of opium. 5) Investment by the broader international community should
include more resources and money into Afghan development projects. 6) Most
importantly, the creation of a coordination center where Afghan officials, the United
Nations and all other multinational organizations and NGOs could supervise, coordinate
and decide on important development projects that will affect the country on both the
national and local level.

Methodology for solving the development issue:
The primary objective of this research is to identify and better understand key
issues affecting state-building interventions and their implications for current and future
governance programming. The objective is to learn how governance works in
Afghanistan’s fragmented society, as well as how it is changing in response to
programmatic interventions supported by the international community. The design of
this research is aimed to identifying key issues in Afghanistan development program with
particular focus on changes taking place in relation to state-building intervention such as
the establishment of Provincial Development Committees (PDCs), the Priority Reform
and Restructuring (PRR) including the Afghanistan Stabilization Program (ASP) and
other United Nation and Red Cross Development process. The research objectives of
exploring key issues in Afghanistan development program context called for a primarily
qualitative methodology. I will use a combination of methods but most specifically the
qualitative tools used in this research include semi-structured interviews, focus groups,
oral histories, subject biographies, and journalists accounts (media monitoring). I will

17

primarily rely on what is already written and analyze it according to my hypothesis, and
fill the gap of different research studies. The research will mainly focus on secondary
sources, however efforts will be put into use primary sources. My research focuses on the
rural but also urban society of Afghanistan, the intention is to compare and contrast the
insecure and poorest areas of Afghanistan with the newly developed areas.

18

Chapter 1: Review of the Relevant Literature
The topic of development in Afghanistan has drawn a wealth of critique and
debate over what should be done in order to rejuvenate the economy, eliminate poverty,
and how to improve progress to its full potential. In order to properly assess the
development of Afghanistan, I will use the UNDP’s human development indices that
analyze a country’s development base on a specific set of criteria. I won’t be focusing on
all of the aspects but the ones, which have affected and plagued the afghan people. I will
focus on the following criteria: 1) Economy, inequality and poverty. 2) Public health.
The articles, books, UN organization developmental programs that will be covered in this
literature review are in the order of:
1) A World Bank Country Study, Afghanistan—State Building, Sustaining Growth, and
Reducing Poverty, 2) The Human Development Index Report (2010), 3) Afghanistan
National Development Strategy (2008-2013) A Strategy for Security, Growth and
Poverty Reduction,4) Country Cooperation Strategy for WHO and Afghanistan, 5) David
Shams “Democracy’s Dilemma, The Challenges to State Legitimacy in Afghanistan,” 6)
Ahmed Rashid, “Descent into Chaos, The U.S and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan,
and Central Asia,” 7) Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart “Fixing Failed States, A
framework for rebuilding a fractured world,” 8)John D. Montgomery and Dennis A.
Rondinelli “ Beyond Reconstruction in Afghanistan,” 9) Francis Fukuyama “Nationbuilding, Beyond Afghanistan, and Iraq,” 10) Building On Early Gains in Afghanistan’s
Health, Nutrition, and Population Sector,” 11) UNAMA),12) UNODC & UNDCP, 13)
AIHRC and AIHRC Social and Economic .
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The two major sources of primary statistical data for this analysis are the World
Bank’s World Development Reports from the years relevant to this study and the United
Nations’ Human Development Reports from analogous years. The World Bank’s annual
World Development Report assesses the current economic, social and environmental
state of all countries. Each yearly report focuses on a different aspect of development that
is explored in depth. Each report also tracks common key economic indicators, such as
Gross National Product, External Debt, Official Development Assistance and Average
Annual Growth that are common to all reports. These numbers will provide the basis for
the quantitative analysis of economic development in Afghanistan. The most recent
report, includes figures that indicate how wealth is distributed within Afghanistan and
illustrates what part of the population is the beneficiary of development. The report
observes the equity of opportunity for all members within a society. A more human focus
is equally important to this thesis and so some additional figures, like the percent of the
population living on less than one dollar a day, which is considered below the global
poverty level, are used from this report but are not always available for all years.

When it comes to the economy, the World Bank country study holds a good grasp
of the situation in Afghanistan’s economy. In its 2004 report of the countries economic
situation, it explains the progression of Afghanistan’s economy since the fall of the
Taliban. It provides a description and analysis of the Afghan economy and recent
performance based on available quantitative data and qualitative information. It also
reviews the state of the economy at the end of the conflict and, it discusses Afghanistan’s
strong growth performance. Two-thirds came from agriculture, thanks mainly to better
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precipitation, and better availability of seeds and fertilizers. Other drivers behind it are
that cereal output has strongly recovered, but opium production also has rebounded.
Services are booming, mainly in major cities, in construction, and in the public sector,
linked to the reconstruction effort. A strong sign of improved confidence, 2.4 million
refugees have come back to Afghanistan, and 600,000 internally displaced people have
returned to their homes.37 The World Bank also outlines the structures of the Afghan
economy, with an emphasis on the informal economy and its linkages with conflict and
insecurity. It is inherently difficult to estimate the size of the informal economy, except in
sectors where it is dominant like agriculture and narcotics. Nevertheless, it is clear that
some 80-90 percent of economic activity in Afghanistan occurs in the informal sector,
which has been largely responsible for the recent economic recovery and dynamism.38
The World Bank report shows the prospects for growth and areas of growth potential for
Afghanistan regarding sustained long-term economic growth, ranging from agricultural
production and processing to mining, construction, trade, and other services.39
The Human Development Report, an annual report published by the United
Nations Development Program (UNDP), also includes key economic developmental
indicators, however, it puts a greater emphasis on human and social criteria like access to
safe water sources, health services, life expectancy and maternal mortality rates. This
data complements the World Development Report data as it focuses more precisely on
improvements in the human sector. The development of human and social criteria like
level of education, access to sanitation and infant mortality rates will be analyzed along
37
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with economic data to determine what type of development took place and if it will be
lasting, superficial, or nationwide. The concept of human development focuses on human
opportunity and human freedom. The goal of human development is that all humans be
afforded the same conditions that allow them to lead productive and prosperous lives.
Scholars and practitioners who study human development assess long-term development
issues rather that only immediate economic income-related development. The Human
Development Index, formulated by the UN and outlined in the Human Development
Report, rates the expectancy, education as measured by literacy, and a decent standard of
living as represented by level of per capita income. Although the report highlights the
importance of human development it concedes that human development does not
necessarily affect economic growth.40 A rise in human development does not necessarily
imply economic growth, and similarly, a rise in economic growth as indicated by
macroeconomic indicators, does not necessarily mean improvement in the human and
social domains.41
The UNDP Afghanistan program, is guided by the requirements set forth in the
National Development Framework (NDP), UNDP Afghanistan focuses its activities on
the following UNDP global practice areas: poverty reduction, democratic governance and
crisis prevention and recovery. All of UNDP’s activities take place under the leadership
of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan and in close collaboration with
ministries, agencies, and donors leading programs within the consultative group equality
in Afghanistan, ensuring that gender issues are consistently mainstreamed and carefully
40
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paced.42 All UNDP program activities aim to consolidate peace, enhance security and
promote respect for the rule of law. In addition to direct support to the national security
sector, UNDP projects enhance the government institutional capacity to provide public
services and to create an enabling environment for legitimate livelihoods.43
The Afghanistan National Development Strategy (2008-2013, A Strategy for
Security, Governance, Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction) has conducted a wide
range of research and survey on this important link between Security, Governance,
Economic Growth and Poverty that all effect in a certain way the degree of progress it
could have in the development process of Afghanistan. The Afghanistan National
Development Strategy (ANDS) represents the combined efforts of the Afghan people and
the Afghan Government with the support of the international community to address the
major challenges facing the country. To comprehensively address the security,
governance, and development needs of Afghanistan, the government has developed the
ANDS. The ANDS reflects the government’s vision, principles and goals for
Afghanistan, which builds on its commitment to achieve the Millennium Development
Goals by 2020 and the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact benchmarks. The
Strategy is based upon an assessment of current social and economic conditions; offers
clear intermediate objectives; and identifies the actions that must be taken to achieve
these national goals. The ANDS largely focuses on five years (2008-2013), but reflects
Afghanistan’s long-term goals, which include the elimination of poverty through the
emergence of a vibrant middle class, an efficient and stable democratic political
environment and security throughout the country. A comprehensive “bottom up”
42
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approach was used in the development of the ANDS that has taken into account all
aspects of social and economic life as well as aspects of social and economic life as well
as fully reflecting the diversity of people in all parts of the country.44 Considerable efforts
were made to ensure that sub national consultations (i.e., outside of central government in
the capital Kabul) identified the priorities of the Afghan people living in each of the 34
provinces.45 The ANDS is the product of extensive consultations and the national,
provincial and local levels. Most of my interviewee data will derive from this study. In
order to take on the challenge of poverty reduction and underpin the development of the
Government’s poverty reduction strategy, it is essential to understand poverty, its
dimensions, characteristics, and determinants. According to ANDS 2008 survey data,
while far from perfect, permits a preliminary analysis of urban and rural poverty in
Afghanistan.46

Information on the specific nature of poverty in Afghanistan is restricted by the
considerable quality and quantity limitations, with National Risk and Vulnerability
Assessment (NRVA) comprising the majority of information available. These have been
based on limited household surveys. The 2005 NRVA covered approximately 31,000
households, allowing national and provincial poverty rates to be assessed. While the 2005
NRVA survey was a substantial improvement on previous studies, it also has several
weaknesses with only one season being covered. To overcome this, separate survey
conducted in spring 2007. Ongoing data collection includes the planned 2007/2008
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NRVA survey (predominantly funded by the European Commission). This study will
cover all seasons and the consumption module includes assessment of more food items
and non-food items. Moreover, stronger emphasis has been placed on survey design and
the collection and computation of high quality of data.

Much of the literature that addresses the progress of development in Afghanistan
touches upon the major advances of the health system is availability to its people and the
progress this system has made in this specific field. In Building on Early Gains in
Afghanistan’s Health, Nutrition, and population Sector: Challenges and Options, Tekabe
A.Belay describes Afghanistan’s health system as functioning quite poorly until late
2001.47 There was little coverage of preventive and curative health services for a number
of reasons. The prolonged civil war, the shortage of staff in rural areas, and the absence
of explicitly articulated national priorities all resulted in limited availability and quality of
services. Coverage of services such as skilled birth attendance, antennal care, and
vaccination was very low, with severe consequences for health outcomes.48 In 2001, the
infant mortality rate (IMR) was estimated at 165 per 1,000 live births, and the under-five
mortality rate (U5MR) was estimated at 257 per 1,000 live births.49 The maternal
mortality ratio was as high as 6,507 per 100,000 in some parts of the country.
Afghanistan’s health sector has come a long way since 2002.50 A number of development
partners, especially the World Bank, the European Union, and the U.S Agency for
International Development (USAID), have been key supporters of the government of
47
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Afghanistan’s effort to rebuild and strengthen the health sector. Together the three donors
invested more than $820 million between 2003/04 and 2008/09 and played key roles in
helping the government reshape the health sector.51 This support continues, with all
partners starting new projects aimed at further strengthening the sector and building on
the successes that have been achieved. In the book Building on Early Gains in
Afghanistan’s health, Nutrition and Population sector it aims to document the
achievements in rebuilding Afghanistan’s health system over the period 2002-08;
contribute to the development of a set of practical policy options that will further increase
the quality, availability and use of health services by the poor and other vulnerable
groups, provide policy options for the MOPH as it defines its future role in the sector;
and suggest how the development partners can best support the efforts of the government.
It focuses on practical issues and examines a number of policies that are feasible to
implement.
WHO, Country Cooperation strategy for WHO and Afghanistan addresses the
current challenges in trying to develop health system policy in Afghanistan. Since the
beginning of 2002 the ministry of Public Health has made significant progress in charting
the direction of the health sector for the medium term. It has formulated a clear and welldefined national health policy for 2005-2009 and a national health strategy for 20052006. The three broad elements of health policy aim at: implementing health services
(BPHS), the essential package of hospital services (EPHS) and the establishment of
prevention and promotion programs; reducing morbidity and mortality by improving the
quality of maternal and reproductive health and the quality of child health initiatives; and
building institutional capacities through the promotion of institutional and management
51
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development, strengthening human resources, especially of female staff, and
strengthening health planning, monitoring and evaluation at all levels of health care.52
Some of the major health development challenges include: abysmally high maternal,
infant and under-five mortality rates; widespread nutritional deficiency associated with
food insecurity, made worst by the recent drought; high incidence of communicable
disease, notably malaria and tuberculosis; poorly developed health infrastructure; security
concerns and lack of communication infrastructure which further limits access to health
care, and extreme shortage of trained health human resources, especially at mid level, and
female health workers of all categories. 53

The WHO Country Cooperation Strategy (CCS) is a reference framework at the
country level for WHOs cooperation with Afghanistan for the next four years for use to
improve the country’s health sector performance. In developing the CCS, the country’s
needs and expectations are considered within the regional and global priorities of WHO.
The key principles governing WHO’s quest for a new strategic agenda at the country
level are54:
-Greater focus on those programs where WHO has the greatest relative advantage
- More emphasis on WHO’s role as policy adviser
- Wider partnerships and greater attention to partners’ strategies and activities
- Maintenance of the visibility and credibility of WHO and differentiation of WHO’s
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- Guidance for achieving the health sector-related Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs).

David Sham’s paper “Democracy’s Dilemma, The challenges to State Legitimacy
in Afghanistan” notes that there are three main elements to hinder the process of
reconstruction and reform, as well as the formation of a legitimate state in Afghanistan:
human rights violations, institutional corruption, and drug cultivation and trade.55 All
three elements have stemmed from the methods and the policies that the state has
assumed in an effort to succeed in the reconciliatory process with the warring factions.
The state has taken these measures to prevent the recurrence of another armed conflict
between the state and the warlords, which could easily lead to chaos and political
destabilization throughout the country. Analysis and assessment by political scientists are
not only sources that point to the obscurity of issues that the Afghan state has to face in
order to achieve legitimacy among the Afghans, and to protect its territorial and political
sovereignty.56 David shams brings helpful data in assessing the gravity and
comprehending the intricacy of various social, political and economic matters in
Afghanistan.57 In 2006, when President Karzai openly admitted to its institutional
corruption, he also said that many state officials benefit from the well-developed illegal
drug industry. The public’s perception matches President Karzai’s observation. The
involvement of civil servants in drug trade has created serious impediments on the path of
the Afghan state and the international community’s war against drugs. Drugs and
corruption are two different, and yet intertwined issues that have posed great challenges
55
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to the creation of a sovereign and legitimate state in Afghanistan. The problem of a
complex unlawful drug economy and the deep penetration of those who play crucial role
in its cultivation and trade within the state’s various institutional structures
collaboratively reinforce each other.58 This reality threatens to transform Afghanistan
from a democratic to narco-state, and weaken the institutional organization of the
government. Therefore, the public is unhappy and suspicious of a government perceived
as under the control and in service of the corrupt officials/warlords. The lack of capacity
on part of the state in implementing law, and in providing sufficient security and other
social services has also spoiled the perception of the state as a sovereign entity in the eyes
of the Afghans.
Clearly, utilizing a combination of granted political power and large sums of
drug-dollar, corrupt state officials have skillfully placed themselves in a position above
the law, which in turn, has severely damaged the legitimacy and sovereignty of the state.
This is evident in numerous media stories from Afghanistan, in which the participation of
warlords in drug trade (as prominent state employees) is the central theme. These reports
mainly focus on the involvement of chiefs of police, governors, and even ministers in
drug trade and other illegal activities.59 The accused officials have failed to serve the
public giving priority to their own self-interest at the expense of the public’s social,
political, and economic welfare. Largely, this reality is the result of a joint policy
embraced by the Afghan and the U.S decision makers. They have chosen to reward
warlords in return for their collaboration in the war on terror.60 The strategy of appeasing
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warlords comes in direct clash with the state and the international community’s
objectives of eradicating drugs and corruption in Afghanistan.

Offering a qualitative critique of development and state-building in the aftermath
of the Afghanistan invasion, Ahmed Rashid warns of an inefficient and lack of
cooperation among international organization, NGOs and the U.S as its predominant
actor in its development of Afghanistan. In the third and ninth chapter of his book,
Descent into Chaos, the U.S and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia,
and the Failure of National Building, Rashid divulgates a series of assembled verified
failure incidents that have not only deteriorated Afghanistan development but have
increased the corruption and insecurity in Afghanistan. This book shows how the United
States ignored consolidating South and Central Asia – the homeland of global
terrorism—in favor of invading Iraq. American resources and military manpower that
Afghanistan should have received went to Iraq. “Iraq was more than just a major
distraction to Afghanistan,” says Kofi Annan in retrospect. “Huge resources were
devoted to Iraq, which focused away from nation building in Afghanistan. The billions
spend in Iraq were the billions that were not spend in Afghanistan.”61 Moreover, the U.S
attack on Iraq was critical to convincing Musharraf that the United States was not serious
about stabilizing the region, and that it was safer for Pakistan to preserve its own national
interest by clandestinely giving the Taliban refuge. First Afghanistan and then in Iraq, not
enough U.S troops were deployed, nor were enough planning and resources devoted to
the immediate postwar resuscitation of people’s lives. There was no coherence to U.S
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tactics and strategy, which led to vitally wrong decisions being taken at critical
moments—whether it was reviving the warlords in Afghanistan or dismantling the army
and bureaucracy in Iraq. This book is about American failure to secure the region after
9/11, to carry out nation building on a scale that could have reversed the appeal of
terrorism and Islamic extremism and averted state collapse on a more calamitous scale
than could ever have happened before 9/11. Bank estimates that there are now twenty-six
failing states in the world that could breed terrorism, as opposed to seventeen such states
in 2003. Clearly, we have gotten a great deal wrong about the post—9/11 world.62 This
book is an attempt to frame events and their consequences across the largest landmass in
the world, and to show what went wrong on the ground and why, while describing how
such poor decisions were made in Washington. It tries to answer the question of why the
world is less secure seven nine years after 9/11.

Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, through an analysis of state-building efforts in
failed states, critique the way the West strategy to help develop the country of the 3rd
world isn’t working and new personalized strategies need to be implemented. In their
book, the Fixing Failed States, A frame work for rebuilding a fractured world, they argue
for a reorientation in the international response to create capable states. The key to state
building is first to agree on a goal and functions of the state to support this objective and
then to follow up with a pragmatic search for means of implementation.63 Therefore, the
book proposes a strategic framework for defining the functions of the state, designing the
organizational structure necessary for the performance of those functions, and aligning
62
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actors to the goal of state building. It presents ideas for recognizing international security
so that political and economic organizations can serve the purpose of creating and
sustaining effective states. When applied to a specific context, our framework translates
into a strategic map for understanding the strengths and weakness of individual functions.
On this basis, specific strategies can then be devised that are tailored to context and deal
with the issue of sequencing in a systemic way. Strategies would be cemented through
“double compacts: between country leadership and the international community on the
one hand and the citizenry on the other”.64 Finally the book purposes methods for
comparative reporting on state capacity in the form of a “sovereignty index” that would
be presented each year to the General Assembly of the United Nations and to the annual
meetings of the World Bank.65 This framework argues for a citizen-based approach to
state building: a new legal compact between citizen, state and the market, not a top-down
imposition of the state. The forty-sixty states now in crisis cannot follow Europe’s path to
state formation from the sixteenth to the twentieth century.66 While the legitimate use of
force is an important criterion in defining states, it is no longer the sole criterion. Our task
is to establish legitimate states at a time when the use of force has reached its limit. States
now derive their legitimacy from performing specific functions in the economic, social
and political domains. Even if it were desirable, it is neither credible nor feasible to
impose order from the top down. Rather, the solution must come through establishing
legitimacy in the eyes of the international community and a country’s citizens. It does not
make sense to conceive of sovereignty as an untrammeled right, divorced from
obligations both to the population governed and to the international community of states.
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This principle—that the rights of sovereignty also entail obligations—is fundamental to
the legitimacy of states and therefore to their ability to close the de facto gap in their
sovereign capacities.67

John Montgomery and Rondinelli also provide qualitative support in favor of
changing the way developmental strategies have been structured. They unfold lessons of
experience on which donors can draw in implementing plan for reconstruction and
development in Afghanistan. Some reveal successful policies that can be modified and
adapted to Afghanistan’s condition and needs, and others are derived from less successful
programs and mistakes that donors can avoid. None of the successful programs of the
past can be extended to Afghanistan without considering the condition of success, and
some may not be replicable at all. It is certain, however that policies that are informed by
knowledge and understanding of the past offer better prospects of success than those who
merely respond to immediate needs, however urgent.

The issue of consent, which Francis Fukuyama, describes as “Nation-building,
Reconstruction versus development” challenges the UN developmental programs today.
Nation-building may be examined from two different types of activities, reconstruction
and development. Although the distinction between the two is often blurred, it was
always present to nation-builders of earlier generations dealing with post-conflict
situations. Reconstruction refers to the restoration of war-torn or damaged societies to
their preconflict situation. Development, however, refers to the creation of new
institutions and the promotion of sustained economic growth, events that transform the
67
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society openendedly into something that it has not been previously.68 There is a huge
conceptual difference between reconstruction and development. Reconstruction is
something that outside powers have shown themselves historically able to bring about.
Reconstruction is possible when the underlying political and social infrastructure has
survived conflict or crisis or crisis: the problem is then the relatively simple matter of
injecting sufficient resources to jumpstart the process, in the form of supplying food,
roads, buildings, infrastructure, and the like.69 Development however, is much more
problematic, both conceptually and as a matter of pragmatic policy.
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Chapter 2: Mission Mandates and Descriptions
UNAMA—United Nation Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

The UN intervention in Afghanistan was designed to assist the Afghan people in
laying the foundations for sustainable peace and development but also to help end the
violent conflict, insurgency and terrorism. UNAMA’s program, mandates and
description, has the lead role in coordinating the operational activities of UN institutions,
including their support to consultative group and national activities budget processes.
UNDP helped the interim Government of Afghanistan to establish an Aid Coordination
Unit and Public information Unit within the Afghan Assistance Coordination Agency.
The Aid Coordination Unit created a donor assistance database to respond to the need for
a donor tracking system, identified in the NDF.70 UNAMA has special responsibilities in
the areas of national reconciliation (supporting the work of the Special Commission on
the Emergency Loya Jirga, recently completed); human rights (monitoring, reporting,
investigating violations and recommending corrective action); rule of law (supporting the
Judicial Commission established by the Bonn Agreement); the role of women (supporting
women’s rights and participation in society); and humanitarian affairs (coordinating U.N.
relief, recovery, and reconstruction efforts within the U.N. system and with the Afghan
Interim – and now the Transitional – Authority).71 In Resolution 1401, the Security
Council requested that ISAF work in close consultation with the Secretary General and
SRSG Brahimi, and urged bilateral and multilateral donors to coordinate their activities
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closely with SRSG Brahimi and the Afghan Interim Administration and its successors,
through the Afghanistan Support Group (a development aid and assistance coordinating
body created in 1997 by the fifteen largest donors to Afghanistan and the European
Union)72 and the Implementation Group (the reconstruction aid and implementation
group co-chaired by the Afghan Interim and now Transitional Authority and World Bank,
which meets regularly to coordinate reconstruction efforts, bringing together
representatives of the international community and bilateral donors).73 The Council
likewise called on all Afghan parties to cooperate with UNAMA in the implementation of
its mandate and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its staff throughout
the country.
Tasks of UNAMA’s Two Pillars

Political Affairs74
a. Monitor, analyze and report on overall political and human rights situation and status of Bonn
Agreement implementation, especially regarding environment for emergency loya jirga;
b. Support the work of the Special Independent Commission of the emergency loya jirga;
c. Maintain contact with Afghan leaders, political parties, civil society groups, institutions and
representatives of central authorities;
d. Maintain contact with representatives of international community;
e. Perform good offices as necessary on behalf of SRSG and in support of efforts of the Afghan
authorities (especially in the areas of conflict control, confidence-building and reconciliation);
f. Provide information and guidance on political issues for the benefit of other UNAMA
activities;
g. Investigate human rights violations and, where necessary, recommend corrective action.
Relief, Recovery and Reconstruction75
a. Articulate strategic vision for U.N. assistance role in Afghanistan that responds to immediate
needs of most vulnerable populations, supports national recovery and reconstruction priorities,
and is rights-based and gender-sensitive;
b. Develop an integrated U.N. assistance program that builds on the comparative advantages,
capacities, experience and mandates of the U.N. assistance community to monitor performance
and to ensure accountability against established standards of performance, with special attention
to measures promoting women’s rights and the achievement of rights of the most disadvantaged
and underserved populations and ethnic groups;
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c. Ensure that U.N. assistance supports capacity-building in counterpart Afghan administrations
and organizations at the national and sub-national levels to develop policy-making, planning,
management, assessment and coordination abilities through technical, material and financial
support to counterpart administrative departments;
d. Create, with the Interim Administration and other partners, an effective program information
and data management system that builds on the Afghanistan Information Management Service to
provide necessary information, in a user-friendly form, on program coverage, performance and
financing, through a range of communications channels, to actors at the national and sub-national
levels and to donors and partners in the international community. This facility would be a semiautonomous U.N.-funded facility, managed by a client board (Interim
Authority, U.N., NGO and donor representation) co-located with the Afghanistan Assistance
Coordination Authority;
e. Ensure that national and sub-national activities of the U.N. offices, agencies, funds and
programs are conducted efficiently, cost-effectively, in a coordinated manner and in cooperation
with other actors – governmental, non-governmental, private sector and international – as
appropriate;
f. Assign, in agreement with the national administration, thematic and sectoral lead coordination
responsibilities to the U.N. agencies, funds and programs, as appropriate to support counterpart
departments to oversee and coordinate all actors – national and international – and activities in
each sector, to ensure actions are coherent and responsive to needs;
g. Oversee, guide and support regional relief, recovery and reconstruction coordinators in the
regional UNAMA offices, enabling them to ensure coherent U.N. agency capacity-development
support to local counterpart authorities and other partners to ensure cross-sectoral coordination;
h. Represent U.N. assistance community to the international and donor communities, to ensure
appropriate integrated reporting on the overall performance of the U.N. assistance community, to
ensure timely reporting to the U.N. bodies as necessary, to mobilize resources for relief,

UNODC: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime &
UNDCP: United Nation International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP)
Both these programs are committed to the elimination of illicit crop cultivation in
Afghanistan. A key component of these programs are the Afghanistan Annual Opium
Poppy Survey published every year. These surveys are primarily a monitoring tool,which
allows to: aim to provide information on the location and extent of poppy cultivation, and
the key production and pricing statistics for raw opium gum. The information gathered by
the survey leads to an understanding of the outcome of the past season, and the
identification of trends in poppy cultivation. This information contributes to planning and
resource allocation within UNDCP and UNODC, and other multilateral, bilateral, and
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non-government agencies. National authorities are also increasingly using the survey to
monitor domestic cultivation and production.76
These surveys are a ground-based census that visits all villages that are known to have
cultivated poppy in the past, or that have recently commenced poppy cultivation. The
survey employs a large, well-trained team of Afghan nationals. Each team member
completes a survey form with data concerning the village poppy area, yield and growing
conditions. The survey also contributes to UNDCP’s Global Illicit Crops Monitoring
Program.77 The objectives of this program are to define international core indicators on
illicit crop cultivation, to establish uniform methodologies for data collection and
analysis, to increase host government’s capacity to monitor and develop replacements to
these illicit crops and to assist the international community in monitoring the extent and
evolution of illicit crops in the context of the elimination strategy adopted by the
member-states at the Special Session of the General Assembly in June 1998. 78

AIHRC: Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission
Because of the need to build a new, democratic Afghan society, that respects human
rights, the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) was written into the
Bonn Agreement in December 2001. AIHRC was given the responsibility for developing
a national plan of action for human rights in Afghanistan, including human rights
monitoring and implementing of a national program of human rights education,
undertaking national human right consultation and the development of domestic human
rights institutions. The commission is required to submit opinions, recommendations,
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proposals, and reports to local, regional, and national authorities. It is also mandated to
promote the harmonization of Afghan laws and practices with international human rights
instruments to which Afghanistan is a party. AIHRC is mandated to monitor the situation
of human rights, where the liberty of people have been denied, restricted or violated in
police custody detention centers, prisons, juvenile prisons, and other situations where
human rights are vulnerable. The commission also monitors freedom of speech and the
status of women and children. The AIHRC investigates specific complaints of human
rights violations, involving abuses of authority and seeks remedies to end the abuses.
Where violations and abuses of human rights are identified, the Commission has a
mandate to take steps to protect and to promote human rights, including through
advocacy and submission of reports to the Government.
AIHRC also have a economic and Social Rights that I will be a concentrating on. The
role of national human rights institutions in monitoring economic and social rights has
been recognized by the United Nations Economic and Social Council, in particular in
conducting research to assess the extend to which these rights are being realized, either
within the country as whole or for specific vulnerable group. The AIHR Social and
economic rights emphasizes the role of national human rights institutions in ensuring that
economic, social, and cultural rights are enforced and protected and to ensure that the
Millennium Development Goals is consistent with state obligations under international
human rights instruments. The main issues covered in this analysis will focus on:
-‐
-‐
-‐
-‐
-‐
-‐

The right to an adequate standard of living—household vulnerability;
The right to property and the right to adequate housing;
The right to water;
The right to health;
The right to education;
The right to participate in development; The right to an effective remedy;
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Chapter 3: Analysis
3.1 The Economic and Public Health context of Afghanistan
Almost a decade of civil war following the military conflict and intervention of
the Soviet Union has left Afghanistan significantly destroyed. Since Afghanistan had no
growth or negative growth, according to the Guimbert report the average growth was
1960-1970 of 2 percent, and 3.6 percent for 1970-1978. From 1978-1990 Afghanistan’s
real income level decreased 1.8 percent (i.e., negative GDP growth)79. With the Taliban
dominating the political landscape from 1996 onwards, Afghanistan had been moving
backwards in all aspects. The result of war, the destruction of core institutions of state
and a heavily war ridden economy led to unrivaled levels of absolute poverty, large scale
illiteracy, high human rights violations with no sense of security and rule of law and the
almost complete disintegration of gender equality. Based on Maddison (2001) and Penn,
GDP growth was negative until mid-90s with a small recovery to then plummet again
with further reductions until 200180. The 1998-2001 period also included a severe
drought with a large impact on agriculture, the main economic activity until very
recently.
Afghanistan’s post-2001economic conditions and post conflict recovery has been
severely damaged or completely destroyed. The ravages of conflict have bestowed upon
Afghan citizens and the Karzai administration the inheritance of debt and not much
wealth.
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3.2.1. Economy and Reconstruction
Afghanistan’s economic recovery from the fall of Taliban (2002-2003):

In 2002, the official (non-opium) GDP, starting from a very low base, grew
dramatically by 29 percent in 2002 and by 16 percent in 2003. Economic activity has
expanded rapidly as a consequence both of the post conflict recovery, a demand impulse
based on donor financed spending (especially since 2004/2005) and drug money. Twothird’s of this growth came from agriculture, thanks mainly to better precipitation and
better availability of seeds and fertilizers.81 Cereal output strongly recovered, but opium
production also rebounded.82 Services are booming, mainly in major cities, in
construction, and in the public sector, linked to the reconstruction effort. A strong sign of
improved confidence, 2.4 million refugees have come back to Afghanistan, and 600,000
internally displaced people have returned to their homes.83 The end of a major conflict,
with associated revival of economic activity, and the end of the drought in many parts of
the country, which brought sharp increase in agricultural production, is two key drivers of
this dramatic economic recovery. Sound government policies, as well as structural
reforms in certain areas, have supported the recovery.84

In 2003, Afghanistan’s GPD is estimated at around $7 billion (including $2.3 billion of
illicit opiate receipts)85. From 2003 to 2006 a catch-up effect is fading out, growth in the
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medium and long term depends to an ever greater extent upon improvements in
governance and a successful integration into the world economy, while foreign aid will
remain a key contributor. Private investment had consistently grown since 2002 and
reached a peak in 2005/2006, reflecting untapped economic opportunities of the country
and an improved macroeconomic stance.86

Legal economic activity has been stimulated by the large influx of international
aid, accompanied by the return of many skilled people and businesspeople from the
Afghan Diaspora, crowded in by the large reconstruction budget. A limited number of
large foreign direct investments for example in the telecoms sector and other services
have also contributed to growth and productivity. Exports (official) have been growing
rapidly, more so than the real GDP (see Table 1), even if the country has developed no
new export sectors outside the traditional sectors of carpets, minerals and horticultural
products.87 Vulnerability to drought was responsible for lower GDP growth in 2006/07,
although growth is expected to rise based on a post-drought rebound in agricultural
production (see Table 1). Moreover, a large proportion of GDP is accounted for by
foreign aid and assistance. Large inflows of aid, coupled with inflows of hard currency
from the opium economy has led to a relative appreciation of the Afghani, and higher
costs of labor and other inputs for Afghan producers, undermining the competitiveness of
the manufacturing sector. However, the manufacturing sector has been able to keep up
with the rest of the licit economy in terms of growth. Non tradable sectors in general have
been growing more than the rest of the economy.
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Table 1 shows the GDP growth and per capita evolution since 2001. Except for
the 2004/2005 and 2006/2007 drought-induced slowdown in agriculture the transitional
economy has grown rapidly posting double-digit growth rates. The ADB reports growth
in the 2007/2008 reached 13.9 percent (ADB, 2008). Assuming the externally financed
development efforts are sustained and that climatic factors do not affect agricultural
production, the economy is expected to grow between 8.4 and 9 percent during
2008/2009 period (IMF, 2008a and ADB, 2008). But given the size of the informal
economy these numbers appear to underestimate real economic performance (World
Bank, 2005c). Accurate data is lacking but estimates of Afghanistan’s GDP per capita is
$335 (IMF, 2008a) with an estimated 70% of the population living below the $2 a day
poverty line (DFID, 2006).
Table 1. Afghanistan, Real GDP (annual percentage change), Official exports
(annual percentage change) and GDP per capita (US dollars)
Estimates
Projections
2002/
2003

2003/
2004

2004/
2005

2005/
2006

2006/
2007

Real
28.6
15.1
9.4
16.4
6.1
GDP
Official
43.6
112
26.4
7.9
exports
Per
Capita
182
199
252
300
335
GDP
Source: IMF (2008a, 2008c) and WEO (2008)

2007/
2008

2008/
2009

2009/
2010

2010/
2011

13.5

9.0

9.0

8.0

13.8

25.7

22.1

20.1

383

433

…

…

3.2.2 Investment:
According to Afghanistan’s Investment Support Agency (AISA), the licit
investment peaked in 2006/07 driven by donor-funded government investment. However
private investment declined in the same period, with 2005 marking the inflexion point.
Also, the AISA reported a decline in the number of new business registrations in
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2006/07. Similarly, the IMF (2008c) reports foreign direct investment reaching in 2005 a
peak at 4.2 percent of GDP, reduced to 3.4 percent in 2006/07 and projected at 3.3
percent until 2009. Based on AISA registrations, only services and construction seem to
be attracting more investments, especially from within the country and by 2007, most
sectors have not yet reached the 2005 level.

Table 2. Total Number of companies registered with AISA (as of
December 2007)
Sector
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total
Total Number of
companies
3.243 1.386 2.503 2.046 2.096 11.274
Domestic
1.474 1.137 2.123 1.746 1.925 8.405
Construction
596
554 1.309 1.048 1.249 4.756
Industry
611
401
546
422
291
2.271
Agriculture
118
33
48
45
35
279
Service
149
149
220
231
350
1.099
Foreign
101
249
380
300
171
1.201
Construction
53
94
111
93
65
416
Industry
24
34
68
47
22
195
Agriculture
0
3
6
3
5
17
Service
24
118
195
157
79
573
Source: AISA

3.2.3 Macroeconomic Policies (fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate management)
Another important economic recovery has been macroeconomic stability—a
remarkable achievement by the government after more than a decade of high inflation.
Considerable success has been achieved in mobilizing domestic revenues, which from
negligible levels in 2001 reached more than 4 percent of official GDP in 2003.88 The
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government is following a prudent debt policy, under which most external assistance is
sought in the form of grants and credits are taken only at highly concessional rates.89

3.2.4 Finance and Private Sector Development:
The Afghan government has also made progress in reviving the financial system
and supporting private sector development. New financial sector legislation (the Central
Bank Law and Banking Law) was adopted in the summer of 2003 to grant the Central
Bank independence and establish a modern legal framework for the banking system. 90
Significant foreign private investment has been attracted into the telecommunication
sector, with very good results in terms of expansion of private mobile telephone services
across a number of cities on a competitive, cost efficient basis.91

3.3 Trade Reform:
Since 2001, IMF reported that trade has been a very active sector in Afghanistan.
Total trade in 2007 (exports plus imports) was estimated over $8.5 billion (excluding
opium), comprised of $6.7 billion in imports and $1.8 billion in exports, of which $1.2
billion were re-exports and $150 million were smuggling (IMF, 2008a). In five years,
licit trade (official exports) has grown over 300 percent, with volume increasing fourfold. Official imports are equally impressive, growing by a factor of three during the
same period; mostly due to reconstruction efforts (see Table 3). All these improvement
have to do with the fact that the government has implemented a number of reforms to
89
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foster trade. Custom tariffs have been rationalized (elimination of export duties, use of
market exchange rate for imports valuation; streamlined tariff structure—moving from 25
tariff rates of 0-150 percent to six rates between 2.5 percent and 16 percent; new, more
effective broker processes).92 Existing trade agreements have been renewed and new
agreements signed with neighboring countries. At the Cancun trade meeting, government
representatives pledged to build a foreign trade regime that will allow Afghanistan to
easily pass the standards for World Trade Organization accession over the next few
years.93 Quantitative restrictions are extremely few and not imposed for reasons of
protection. Customs administration reforms are underway.
Table 3. Afghanistan: Balance of Payment, 2002/03-2006/07 (In millions of U.S.
dollars)
2002/03

2003/04

2004/05

2005/06

2006/07*

-149.8

-456.2

-265

-182.5

-444

-1371.6

-2932.1

-3894

-4880.3

-5435.5

-1217.6

-2485.7

-3443.3

-4335.3

-4941.6

1290.6

1893.6

1643

1794.8

1801.3

100.1

143.7

305.3

385.9

416.5

1190.5

1749.9

1337.7

1408.9

1384.8

176.6

232.8

152.7

173.7

149.9

1013.9

1517.1

1185.1

1235.2

1234.9

Imports of goods (f.o.b.)

-2508.2

-4379.3

-5086.3

-6130.1

-6742.9

Official imports

-1983.1

-3282.9

-4415.8

-5481.7

-6049.2

-840.8

-1594.4

-2416.2

-3258.3

-3579.4

Current account (including
grants)
Current account (excluding
grants)
Trade balance
Exports of goods (f.o.b.)**
Official exports
Unofficial exports
Smuggling
Transit trade

Of which: Duty free

Smuggling
-525.1 -1096.4
-670.5
-648.4
-693.7
Source: IMF (2008a)
*Preliminary estimate
** Excludes opium exports and, due to limited data availability, flows associated with
U.S. Army and most ISAF activities.
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3.4 The Reconstruction process:
Since Afghanistan is perceived to be of importance in military and political
security among Western industrial countries at the beginning of the 2001, donors drafted
a detailed and comprehensive needs assessment for the reconstruction and development
of Afghanistan with which to solicit external financial aid and launch international
assistance programs in 2002. Some $1.1 billion of external assistance was disbursed in
late 2001 and 2002, mainly for humanitarian purposes and not through government
channels.94 The government presented its National Development Framework (NDF) in
April 2002, which formed the basis of the National Development Budget. Subsequently
the Security Afghanistan’s Future (SAF) reported detailed medium-term investment and
recurrent expenditure requirements and external financing needs and was presented at a
major donor conference in Berlin in March 2004.95 The composition of external
assistance, which increased to $2.5 billion in the 2003/04 financial year, has shifted in
favor of reconstruction, with increasing government leadership.96

3.5 Stimulated economy by foreign aid
Agriculture:
In the agricultural sector performance
has not been so successful, but mostly due to
exogenous factors like the recent drought
that affected cereal production and also the
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interaction between legal agriculture and opium production. Agriculture’s share of GDP
has been diminishing since the mid-90s, but even after a period of drought causing
negative for 20 percent growth in the sector in 2006/2007 (IMF, 2008a), agriculture still
accounts for 32% of estimated total GDP (2003), mainly cereal crops (27%) and by the
opium economy (an estimated 35% of GDP) and it accounted for almost one-half of
Afghanistan’s exports in 2006 (IMF, 2008c). It is also the main occupation and means of
subsistence of the vast majority of the population, although livelihood reliance on
agriculture as a single source has dropped as households in some areas have responded to
drought by diversifying their livelihood strategies (Famine Early Warning Systems
Network ,FEWSNET, 2007).
Other sectors are relatively small, including manufacturing (9%)—most of its smallscale agricultural processing and other small-scale activities, construction (3%), and
public administration (3%). The striking feature of Afghanistan’s economic structure is
the dominance of the informal sector—not only in agriculture and in the drug industry
(outright illegal), but also in the most other sectors. Small-scale generators in the
informal sector, for example, provide a large portion of electricity supply. It is inherently
difficult to estimate the size of the informal economy, except in sectors where it is
dominant like agriculture and narcotics. Nevertheless, it is clear that some 80-90% of
economic activity in Afghanistan occurs in the informal sector, which has been largely
responsible for the economic recovery and dynamism.97
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3.5.2 Opium
Cultivation of poppies remains the largest and most important industry in Afghanistan
(UNODC, 2007). Over 4 percent of the agricultural land (193.000 ha) is devoted to
opium farming and some 3.3 million Afghans are involved in opium cultivation. Opium
income to farmers was $760 million in 2007, while potential exports of opium were $3.1
billion during the same year (Byrd, 2007). However, farmers are receiving a lower
percentage of the potential value of the crop, from 48% in 2002 to only 24.5% in 2006.
This could imply that more processing is being conducted in Afghanistan, or that lower
prices are being paid to farmers. In addition, the share of potential exports of opium to
total GDP declined from 62.4% in 2002 to 44.0% in 2006.98 Opium production has been
increasing rapidly in Afghanistan, from 3,400 metric tons in 2002 to 8,200 metric tons in
2007 (UNODC, 2008). The Afghan opium crop now constitutes 93% of the word’s total
opium output. Despite this growth in output, the number of provinces growing opium has
decreased from a high of 34 in 2004 to 21 provinces in 2007, most of which are located
in the south of the country (see Table 7). Cannabis production is increasing, with some
70.000 hectares cultivated in 2007 (UNODC, 2007). Farm-gate value of opium accounts
for 13 percent of official GDP, whilst the whole opium/heroin sector amounts to 35
percent. Once opium is taken out of the official agriculture figures, legal agriculture is
reduced to 19 percent of official GDP and it becomes the sector with the smallest
contribution.99
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3.5.3 Industry
Afghanistan’s Industry is driven by construction, but also manufacturing, has
been one of the most dynamic sectors during the last five years, accounting for over onequarter of 2006 GDP. Construction is one of the main driving forces behind the growth of
the sector, and was the most dynamic sub-sector in 2006/2007, with 30 percent growth
(IMF, 2008b). This reveals the important resources devoted to infrastructure
reconstruction, but also how the large amounts of drug money are reinvested in real estate
in Afghanistan (the rest is invested outside the country). Textiles, clothes and leather
represented the second largest sub-sector, but it was the largest sector in terms of exports
(including carpets and skins). It is worth noting that even in the presence of strong
foreign inflows the manufacturing sector has been able to keep up with the rest of the
economy in terms of growth, supporting the idea that exchange rate management has
been adequate or in general the benefits associated from investment and stability that go
directly to reinforce country’s competitiveness. However, growth in all these sectors is
influenced by the very low levels from which the sectors started, following a process of
deindustrialization through conflict that, in the last year for which data is available, 1995,
had left Afghan industry with only 10 percent of GDP.100

3.5. 4 The Informal Economy
It has been reported that 80-90 percent of country’s GDP is informal, including 35
percent of illegal opium related activities and an array of other informal activities (World
Bank, 2005c). No accurate estimation exists, but more than one-half of this black
economy (non-opium) is subsistence level agriculture and livestock (World Bank,
100
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2005c). The black economy includes also barter trade, manufacturing and commerce and
other non-recorded services (e.g., the hawala system or electricity from small-scale
generators), but also smuggling and re-exports. The smuggled exports include gravels
and construction materials, gems and semi-precious stones, logging and other nonrecorded exports, but this has decrease from 5 percent of official GDP in 2002/03 to 2
percent in 2006/07. Smuggled imports were estimated at US$690m in 2006/07, but the
contribution from that to the GDP should only include the value added that is generated
in the country and consider the loss in tariff revenues. We roughly estimate this to be
around 2.5 percent of legal GDP in 2007.101 A large re-export activity exists between
Afghanistan and neighboring countries (mostly Pakistan), but the value added from this
activity and hence its contribution to the Afghan GDP is also very low, probably between
2-3.5 percent of official GDP in 2007.102 Based on these rough approximations, the whole
smuggling (imports and exports) and re-export sector would represent no more than 8
percent of official GDP in 2007.

The main components in the informal economy are: non-recorded agriculture and
livestock (~30 percent of official GDP, World Bank 2005c), opium production and
processing activities (35 percent of official GDP, World Bank 2005c), illegal trade (6.5-8
percent of official GDP, as per our estimations) and other non-recorded activities
(including small manufacturing and services).
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3.5.5 Employment
The official figure from the government for unemployment is 40 percent (ANDS).
But little more is known about the size and composition of the labour market in the
country. Using NRVA 2005, we estimated the importance of different sectors in the
occupational profile of the economy (see Annex 2 for the list of occupation and a
description of our aggregated definitions). Table 8 present the results. At the national
level, 66 percent of the households depend on agriculture (including opium103) and
livestock as the main source of income, this number is 66% in rural areas and 14% in the
cities. Trade and services employ 15 percent of the national population but is –as
expected—the main source in urban areas (64 percent as first source, 14 percent as
second source). Manufacturing is just 1 percent at national levels, with 3 percent in urban
areas, being the third largest occupation.

Any discussion of economic growth policy systems must recognize what Pain and
Goodhand have described as the three economic systems that operate in Afghanistan
simultaneously: 104
1) The warlord economy,
2) The black-market economy,
3) The coping or subsistence economy.
The warlord economy is run by what Pain and Goodhand call “conflict entrepreneurs,”
that is, by regional and local armed commanders and fighters who engage in hostilities
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not only to protect ethnic and religious values but also, and perhaps primarily, to make
profits and accumulate wealth and power. Their economy is based on smuggling
consumer goods, minerals, wheat, and opium, informal taxation of both legal and illicit
economic activities, arms trading, economic blockades, asset stripping and looting, and
illegal currency trading. 105 The warlord economy is primarily exploitive rather than
productive. It has disrupted markets, destroyed economic assets, violently redistributed
resources, created illegal entitlements, and further impoverished vulnerable groups. In
some regions, warlords have driven out the better-educated population especially those
associated with minority ethnic or religious groups. The black market economy operated
in some places by warlords consists more widely of noncombatant profiteers, traders in
illegal goods, cross-borders smugglers, poppy farmers and opium dealers, and truck
drivers who constitute the “transport mafia”. Black-market economy participant’s benefit
from continuing military conflict, ethnic and religious tensions, and a weak state. The
black-market economy thrives in the absence of other legal means of making profits and
creating wealth and is primarily diversionary rather than developmental. Participants
derive income from unsustainable extraction of natural resources and minerals;
smuggling of antiquities, rare animals, and minerals; the flourishing hawala money-order
and currency-exchange systems; and the capture and diversion of international aid
resources.106
The coping economy in which most of the Afghan population participates in is
characteristic of a subsistence agricultural sector and a weak system of commercial trade.
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In the coping economy, poor families and communities often exploit the labor of children
in order to survive during periods of widespread asset erosion. Those engaged in the
coping economy obtain their livelihoods from diverse low-risk activities such as
subsistence agriculture, petty trade, and on- and off-farm low wage labor. Some
participants migrate to Pakistan, Iran, or other countries surrounding Afghanistan and
remit part of their earnings to dependents back home. Others survive on income
redistribution and support through extended family, local ethnic and religious networks,
and humanitarian assistance. The coping economy both results from, and reinforces, the
lack of secure and steady employment and long-term investment and the deterioration in
health and education standards.

3.6 Improvements needed in the private sector:
A dynamic private sector is essential for Afghanistan to achieve the robust,
sustained economic growth that is necessary for national poverty reduction, state
building, and other reconstruction objectives. Tremendous entrepreneurial talents exist in
Afghanistan, but in order to be the “engine of growth” the private sector must be able and
encouraged to move beyond the bounds of the informal economy. While Afghanistan will
continue to have a great many small, household and family-based businesses in
agriculture, handicrafts, trade, and other services, some enterprises need to grow into
medium or even large firms, thereby becoming a source of competitiveness for
Afghanistan. According to (…) the challenge for the Government in encouraging and
supporting private sector development is:
(i) To support through macroeconomic policies a strong demand environment for the
private sector, by maintaining robust economic growth;
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(ii) To create a structural and regulatory enabling environment in which private
enterprises can compete and grow;
(iii) To ensure that key infrastructure services (power, roads, water, telecommunication)
are efficiently provided to the private sector; (iv) To help the private sector build capacity
(including through financial services and business support services) so that it will be able
to respond effectively to opportunities. 107
In order for the Afghan economy to run at its fullest potential, it needs to
overcome these challenges: Creative alternative, stable livelihoods and entrepreneurial
opportunities in agriculture, trading services, mining, natural resources development, and
small-scale manufacturing, and the acceleration of macroeconomic growth, may be the
only ways to lure participants from the warlord and black-market economies into
mainstream economic activities and provide those caught in the coping economy with
more fruitful opportunities. Creating those opportunities depends not only on achieving
reconstruction objectives quickly, but also on laying the foundations for long-term
economic growth.

3.6.1 Alternative growth strategies
There is a debate among international development organizations about how best
to initiate economic growth in subsistence economies, and international assistance
organizations have experimented with a wide range of interventions to help poor
countries.108 Two general strategies emerged—a “big push” or “balanced development”
strategy that seeks to promote rapidly a comprehensive set of changes simultaneously in
order to create the conditions that launch and sustain economic growth, and a “leading
sector” strategy that seeks sequential changes in one or two sectors and relies on the
Montgomery, Rondinelli, p. 203
Dennis A. Rondinelli, Development Project as Policy Experiments: An Adaptive Approach to
Development Administration, 2nd Rev. Ed (London: Routledge, 1993)
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creation of lateral linkages and multiplier effects for spreading growth to other sectors of
the economy over time.109
a) The big push strategy relies on observations, primarily in advanced economies,
that all sectors are interdependent and that massive investment is needed in both the
private sector and the public sector simultaneously, in order to trigger economic
growth.110 The interdependence of all sectors implies that investment in only one sector
would not stimulate growth throughout the whole economy. The strategy requires
investment, mainly in industry, but also concurrently in agriculture, services,
infrastructure, education, technology, and health in order to stimulate macroeconomic
growth and to provide mutually reinforcing support in all sectors for continued
development. The experience with international development over the past 50 years,
however indicates that in most countries, a big push approach is often difficult to launch
and the impacts are not always positive. As the United Nation Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) pointed out in its 50-year assessment of development experience,
“such a strategy, based on industry-led growth and often accomplished through an urban
bias in fiscal and social policies largely failed, leaving behind vast rural poverty and food
insecurity while accelerating problems linked to rapid urbanization.”111

b) The other approach, a leading sector strategy, also sees the interdependence of
sectors in the economy but asserts that focused investment in one or two key sectors can
drive growth in all others to which they are linked. More importantly, leading sector
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theorists recognize the limited absorptive capacities, governance and administrative
capacities, entrepreneurial and business skills, and access to capital resources in poor
countries that are needed to make a big push or balanced development strategy work.112
Advocates of leading sector strategy argue that resources should be concentrated in one
or two sectors of the economy that will generate multiplier effects by creating demand in
other sectors, leading to a more equitable distribution of income and wealth. Often the
leading sector chosen for investment is agriculture because the majority of the population
in poor countries earns its livelihood from farming, petty trading, and services in rural
areas. 113 By focusing on agriculture and rural development, economic growth can be
stimulated from the bottom-up rather than top-down, benefiting those in farming and
rural enterprise more quickly and assuring a more equitable distribution of wealth.
Afghanistan’s National Development Framework does not outline a specific strategy for
initiating growth. It does identify a broad set of economic and social reconstruction
projects that might imply a big push approach, but it also recognizes that not all of them
are likely to be undertaken together at the same time. Implying a more sequential
approach, the framework identifies priorities for immediate reconstruction as well as for a
long-term development. The plans of international assistance organization seem to
recognize even more clearly that the existing conditions of Afghanistan and the
experience with economic development in other poor and war-torn countries suggest that
growth must be initiated in the agricultural and rural sectors. By any measure—average
per capita income, life expectancy, other social indicators, or broader indexes like the
U.N Human Development Index (HDI)—Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in
112

United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, “What Have We Learned?” The State of Food and
Agriculture 2000 (Rome:FAO, 2000), p. 4 at http://www.fao.org/docrep/x4400e/x4400e00.htm.
113
Ibid.
57

the world. Afghanistan was very poor before the war and fell further behind the rest of
the world during the past quarter-century. Recent rapid economic growth and
improvements in some social indicators have not yet changed this situation. Since 2003,
2.5 million Afghan refugees have returned to their home country, while an additional
600,000 IDPs have moved back to their place of origin. About 40% of refugees have
returned to Kabul and many others to urban centers across the country.114

3.6.2 Poverty reduction: Main element of growth
The Afghan Government has set ambitious targets for growth and human
development, reflecting the country’s need to make up for a quarter of a century of
conflict. Securing Afghanistan’s Future (SAF; Afghanistan Government 2004) outlines a
scenario with average annual growth of 9 percent for non-drug GDP during the medium
term, with income per capita rising to $500 in 2015.115This scenario is underpinned by an
investment program of $25.6 billion over seven years (with external assistance
requirements, including for recurrent expenditures, of $27.6 billion).116 The SAF report is
equally ambitious in targeting large improvements in social indicators, in line with the
Millennium Development Goals. The gross primary school enrollment rate is targeted to
rise from 54 percent (40 for girls) at present to 100 percent for boys and girls by 2015.
The under-five mortality rate is targeted to decline from 172 to 130 per 1,000 live births,
the infant mortality rate from 115 to 55 per 1,000 live births, and the maternal mortality
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rate from an estimated 1,600 per 100,000 live births to 205.117 Indeed, robust, sustained
economic growth is essential for Afghanistan to secure peace and improve human
development. First, it is a necessary condition to get out of deep poverty—and therefore
the central element of a poverty reduction strategy.118 Second, growth is crucial for state
building and political stabilization.119 Economic growth impacts positively on security,
by creating revenues for the government to build police and army forces and by providing
people with more of a stake in society. Economic growth will also generate viable
alternatives to opium production. Finally, economic growth creates revenue potential,
which if tapped in a transparent and non-distortionary way through effective taxation,
will generate the domestic fiscal resources that will enable Afghanistan over time to
become financially self-sufficient and to provide effective services to its people—another
key factor in poverty reduction.120 Thus the key development challenge for Afghanistan
is to put in place the institutions, policies, and services that will generate sustained,
broad-based economic growth.121 As noted in the SAF report, in addition to the level, the
quality of economic growth will be critical (the quality of growth is very important).
What is needed is growth with improving social indicators (reflecting investments in
human capital) and without a significant deterioration in income distribution.122 This
ensures continuing broad consensus around the policies and decisions needed to create
the enabling environment for economic growth. In the Afghan context, growth needs to
be labor-intensive, sustainable macro-economically and financially, and environment117
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friendly and conducive to social development.123 Growth also needs to be reasonably
well-balanced ethnically and regionally in order to avoid exacerbating political tensions
among different groups and regions. 124

3.6.3 Main Elements of Growth Strategy
In essence, the Afghan Government’s strategy for rapid, sustained, broadbased economic growth centers on the development of a dynamic private sector and is
anchored in four key elements:125
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

Improving security through fair and effective enforcement of law and order
and building an effective, accountable State,
Maintaining macroeconomic stability,
Delivering support services (especially infrastructure), and
Creating an enabling environment for business activity through regulatory
and structural reforms.

The government has already made a very good start by maintaining macroeconomic
stability and initiating some important structural reforms, as well as capacity building in
the administration. These very successful and important initiatives need to be
complemented by capacity building and delivery of key infrastructural services, by easing
the regulatory burden on the private sector and reducing vulnerability to corruption, and
most urgently by improving security and strengthening the rule of law.126
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3.6.4 Rule of Law
The first and most fundamental requirement to break out of the “informal
equilibrium” is to build security, an appropriate legal framework and functioning judicial
system, effective law enforcement mechanisms, and a capable and effective state.127 In
the general term, the stability, security, and prosperity of Afghanistan will depend on the
ability of the state to raise the resources needed to fund the provision of necessary public
services. In the SAF report, the government stated its intention to cover its wage bill in
five to six years time, and its entire recurrent budget in nine to eleven years time.128 Over
the last two years, it has already achieved a significant increase in revenues. Additional
progress in mobilizing resources will depend on:129
(i)
(ii)

The security situation and administrative capacity of the government, and
The structure of the economy.

Security sector reform is critical, and this component will also need to include
reintegration of disarmed combatants. Government capacity building is underway and
needs to be accelerated, on a sustainable basis. Progress in strengthening and reform of
the judiciary, which has lagged, will be crucial. Building on informal institutions to
create formal institutions is a promising option for moving toward a functioning legal
system. Adequate property rights, for instance land titles, enhance the value of assets
because, with appropriate institutions for property disputes, they can be used as collateral
for credit and facilitate a longer time horizon on the part of their owners. 130
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3.6.5 Economic Growth and Development Policy
The reconstruction and development of Afghanistan, following decades of
internal conflict and external military intervention, pose challenging dilemmas for
international assistance organizations and donor countries that have pledged billions of
dollars in aid. Economic growth is essential to generate jobs, income, public revenues,
and the capital needed to reconstruct the country’s destroyed infrastructure. It is needed
to provide some sense of security and to stabilize Afghanistan, politically and socially.
Establishing some degree of social and political stability and military security and at least
minimally effective system governance, are generally recognized as preconditions for
stimulating economic growth. 131In Afghanistan much of the basic agricultural and
manufacturing infrastructure has been destroyed; economic and political institutions have
been weakened; and the domestic and international markets for Afghanistan’s food
supplies, livestock, and manufactured goods have been disrupted or lost. Ethnic and
regional tensions plague a fragmented society, and human capital has deteriorated from
years of interrupted education and training, and from the steady decline in health and
social services. Governance systems in Afghanistan are still weak and state’s authority
barely extends beyond the capital. This is why Afghanistan is so dependent on the aid of
donor government, international aid agencies, international organizations and NGOs to
help it reach the developmental change beyond the capital in order to create a united
growth across the country. These organizations are not to overlook opportunities, repeat
mistakes, and ignore threats and complexities, and waste resources.
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4. Health
4.1 Public Health Overview:
The most progress has been made in Afghanistan’s health sector; it has come a
long way since its invasion. A number of development partners, especially the World
Bank, the European Union, and the U.S Agency for International Development (USAID),
have been key supporters of Afghanistan’s effort to rebuild and strengthen its health
sector. Together the three donors invested more than $820 million between 2003/04 and
2008/09 and played key roles in helping the government reshape the health sector.132 The
key challenges the country is facing include high infant and under-five mortality rates, a
very high maternal mortality ratio, with most deaths preventable if more births were
attended by skilled providers and properly referred; poor sanitation and malnutrition, and
a high burden of disease from malaria and tuberculosis.133

4.1.1 Why is the health sector much more important than other sectors?
It has to do with the fact that Afghanistan has a high agricultural capacity and
good water sources, and agricultural and economic experts believe that Afghanistan has a
capacity high enough to exceed the limit of self-sufficiency in food and agricultural
production. Afghanistan has 7.9 million hectares of arable land, of which only 3 million
hectares are cultivated and about 5 million remain uncultivated.134 Afghanistan uses
merely 30% of its existing water sources. Reconstruction of irrigation system and
investment on water sources can increase food production so that the remaining 5 million
132

Building on Early Gains in Afghanistan’s health, Nutrition, and Population sector, Challenges and
options, the World Bank, p. 1
133
Ibid. p.1
134
http://one.wfp.org/country_brief/asia/afghanistan/annual_report/050511_annualreport.pdf
63

hectares of arable land can be used and on the other hand, harvest from irrigated land is at
least twice that from rain-fed or non-irrigated land.135 The Ministry of Agriculture,
Irrigation, and Animal Husbandry estimates that about 85% of Afghan people are
farmers, though one needs to be skeptical about this figure given the population increase
in urban areas. Sufficient investment is yet to be made in Afghan agriculture and water
sources. Until the Paris Conference, the Afghan government and international community
did not pay the necessary attention to agricultural development and this was a mistake per
se. Agricultural approaches in Afghanistan remain localized and outdated and have yet to
be mechanized; there are no reserves or refrigerating rooms to sustain food items and
fruit. Farmers are forced to urgently offer their products to markets and even sometimes
Afghan fruit is sent to Pakistan, kept in Pakistani reserves for a while, and then exported
to Afghanistan to be sold at a higher rate.136 The year 2008/2009 was a difficult year for
agriculture. Drought dominated throughout Afghanistan and many domestic animals
died. The Afghan government needed over 2.30 million metric tons of wheat to meet the
needs of the people and at the same time, food prices increased. Although government
and World Food Program (WFP) assistance were able to help the needy to some extent
by lowering and controlling food prices, prices still remained high.

4.1.2 The fundamental right to health
The right to the highest attainable standard of health means that all individuals
should have an ever-increasing access to health services and facilities without distinction
of any kind. This involves four dimensions, namely, physical accessibility, economic
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accessibility, informational accessibility, and non-discrimination. Health services,
materials, and facilities should be physically and safely available for all, especially
vulnerable categories of people and all persons should be able to afford such services,
materials, and facilities. On one hand, people have the right to search for information on
health-related issues and on the other, health services and facilities should be provided for
all people without discrimination of any form. Another significant issue is the
acceptability of health services and facilities, meaning that these should be compatible
with people’s mentality and culture and planned so that that they will be accepted by the
general public.

According to Article 12 of International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) it recognizes that all people have the right to the highest
attainable standard of health. Pursuant to international human rights instruments, health
services should be provided cheaply and non-discriminatorily for all.137 Article 52 of the
Afghan Constitution requires the government to provide the means for the prevention and
cure of ailments and to render free health facilities for all citizens.138
4.1.3 Access to Health Services & Insecurity
Although health services are almost free of charge for all Afghan people,
vulnerable segments of population encounter many problems since health services have
poor quality or inadequate geographical coverage. That is why men’s life expectancy is
only 47 years and it is 45 for women—almost half of life expectancy in world’s
developed and wealthier countries. The Afghan government and its international partners
137
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always allude to the development of the health sector as one of their significant
achievements in the past several years. The government claims approximately 85% of all
Afghan people presently have access to health services. Although The Human Rights
Field Monitoring (HRFM) Team (HRFM) findings reveal that such a claim is close to
reality, health services nevertheless face several major challenges in Afghanistan.139
Poor-quality health services and facilities, long distances of health centers from remote
districts, and growing insecurity are among these challenges. On the other hand,
experienced and specialized doctors are unwilling to work in outlying areas for economic
and geographical reasons.

According to Interviews HRFM has conducted in 2008, 92.4% of all interviewees
said that state or NGO health services were available to them, around 7.4% said these
services were unavailable to them, and 0.1% did not answer this question. At the same
time, 56% of all interviewees stated that private health services were available to their
families; around 30.2% said such services were unavailable for their families, and about
13.0% did not answer this question. The added percentage of people who responded that
state or NGO health services were unavailable to them (7.4%) and the percentage of
people who stated that private health services were unavailable to them (30.2%), we will
have a percentage of 37.6%. Therefore, in aggregate terms, about 62.4% of interviewees
have access to state or NGO or private health services, and around 37.6% of interviewees
have no access to state or NGO or private health services. This figure stands in gross
contrast to the claim made by the Government that 85% of all Afghans are covered by
health services.
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State or NGO health services are greater than private ones. According HRFM
survey on the matter, 45.7% of interviewees stated they have access to state health
services, 40.9% stated they have access to private health services, and 13.4% stated they
have access to non-state health services140.

According to HRFM interviews, the number of hospitals is less than that of health centers
and mobile clinics, indicating that health centers and mobile clinics offer around 75% of
health services and the remaining services (25%) are rendered by hospitals.

As mentioned earlier, approximately 93% of people have access to state and nonstate health services, but there are problems in the quality of their access to these
services.
These problems, according to HRFM, include long distances of centers, poor-quality
medicine, poor facilities, and inexperienced personnel. Around 29.2% of interviewees
said that they do not use state or NGO health services. Data shows that 61% of
interviewees use state or NGO health services and around 8.4% did not answer this
140
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question. Accessibility is the most important factor for not using health facilities. The
following figure presents these reasons.

Data shows that physical inaccessibility is the most significant reason why people are not
able to access health services, both public and private. Long distances of health facilities
make it very different for people in outlying districts to access them. Some interviewees
stated that they are forced to pay a lot for transportation in order to reach health centers
like hospitals and some use horses and donkeys to take their patients to health centers,
spending several hours on the way to reach these centers.141 Health services offered by
private institutions also have shortcomings and problems. HRFM data shows that around
8.6% of interviewees do not use private health services, around 47.1% use such services,
and around 44.3% did not reply. Interviewees who do not use private health services
provided the same responses as those who do not use state or NGO health services.
Reasons why interviewees do not use private health services include inaccessibility, poor-
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quality medicine and equipment, and inexperienced personnel. Approximately 25.1% of
interviewees do not use such services because of inaccessibility, 3.8% do not use because
they have to pay money, 4.6% do not use because of poor-quality medicine and
equipment, 5.8% do not use because health personnel are inexperienced, and 1.7% do not
use because there are no female staff. Poor-quality medicine is a key shortcoming of
health services in Afghanistan. This problem is more serious in rural areas and outlying
districts, because the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) exerts less control there. Its been
reported that the Ministry burnt around 3,525 items of outdated and non-standardized
medicine amounting, in general, to 86 tones.142 This shows the Ministry’s monitoring of
health services in the country and at the same time, it is indicative of a huge amount of
outdated and non-standardized medicine in the health market.143

The foregoing shows that people have a problem of physical access to health
centers, either private or state or NGO sponsored and hence, there should be an increase
142
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in the number of health centers in different areas, especially in disadvantaged ones.
Another difficulty is the poor-quality medicine and equipment, and inexperienced and
low-capacity health personnel, to which many interviewees referred. More efforts should
be taken to raise the quality of health services.144

A key component of the right to health is the acceptability of health services. Such
services should be provided that people do not feel alienated and to be “the other”. The
presence of female midwives, nurses, and doctors is a must in hospitals and other health
centers. In many areas, patients do not consult hospitals and clinics unless they are in a
critical condition. This issue is more often seen among women, especially in areas where
there are no women nurses and doctors. The government should train more women as
birth attendants, midwives, nurses, and physicians. As part of government’s reporting to
the electorate, MoPH said that hundreds of female health personnel were trained in
(2008/09).145 The Ministry’s 2009 report says that 19,975 community health personnel
were trained in 34 provinces in the previous year with 50.8% of them being men and
49.2% being women.146

Among other concerns is the growing insecurity which has limited the delivery of
health services. According to the Third Report on Economic and Social Rights of ( )
covering the period from March 2007 to early 2008, health workers have been targeted
by government opposition in southern and southeastern areas, as a result of which the
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government closed down around 36 health centers only in the first three months of 2008,
depriving about 360,000 people of health services134. It is difficult to study whether this
state of affairs has continued, because there is a lack of accurate information as a result of
rising insecurity in (2008/09); but it can undoubtedly be said that security if the situation
has not improved more health centers may have to be shut down.147 The Afghan
Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) is encouraged by the objectives of
Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) to extend the basic package of
health services to at least 90% of the population by 2010.148 However, in line with the
findings of this commission report which indicate that the main obstacle is not the
availability of health care facilities but an inability to access existing health facilities, the
Commission urges the Government and international development partners to focus their
efforts on tackling obstacles preventing access to health facilities, rather than simply
increasing the number of clinics.149

Initials benchmarks in the ANDS Monitoring Matrix indicate that there will be an
emphasis on increasing community access to health care, including outreaches work by
trained health workers. In particular this would address some of the obstacles preventing
rural women from using existing health facilities, and enable access for vulnerable group
such as the elderly, disabled, children, minorities, migrant laborers and remote rural
communities.
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4.2 Women and Children’s health
Afghanistan has some of the highest infant and under-five mortality rates in the world,
although both rates have steadily declined since 1960. In 2002 the number of deaths per
1,000 live births was estimated at 165 for infants and 257 for children under five
(UNICEF 2004). Considerable investments in the health sector since 2003 has
contributed to reductions in both mortality rates: the under-five mortality rate dropped 26
percent and the infant mortality rate dropped 22 percent between 2003 and 2006. At
present the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) target for Afghanistan is to reduce the
infant mortality rate to 82 per 1,000 live births and the under-five mortality rate to 128
deaths per 1,000 live births by 2015. If these targets are to be achieved, Afghanistan
needs to register the progress at a higher rate than it did between 2003, 2006 and 2009.
Infant mortality rate is in every 1,000 live births, under-five child mortality rate is
191 in every 1,000 live births and maternal mortality rate are 1,800 in every 100,000 live
births, placing Afghanistan with the second highest maternal mortality rate in the world
just after Sierra Leone. Though efforts to raise parental awareness on child bearing and
rearing have greatly contributed to the fall of under-five child mortality rate, the existing
child mortality level is unacceptable.150 Under-five mortality rate in Afghanistan is
caused by infectious factors and diarrhea, acute respiratory infections, and vaccinepreventable diseases account for around 60% of mortality cases. HRFM data indicates
that over 62% of women gave birth to their children without the support of professionally
trained health personnel. Of 18 cases recorded by the AIHRC regarding violations of the
right to health, 6 cases—roughly one-third—are related to women’s health. One should
note that addressing women’s health without considering traditions and customs that
150
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deprive them of access to health services will not yield an effective result. Traditional
practices and harmful customs are the main reasons why women are deprived of
accessing health services, while 40% of basic health facilities lack female staff
members.151

Interviews with 6,675 children as part of HRFM indicate that 16.9% of these
children do not use hospitals, clinics, and other health facilities when they fall ill. The
most significant reasons were long distance (43.9%), lack of medicine (13.2%), lack of
women personnel (3.7%), and expensive services (8.8%)130. This is while pursuant to
the Afghanistan Compact, primary healthcare should cover 90% of Afghanistan’s
population by 2010, all under-five children should be vaccinated, and child mortality rate
should drop by 20%.

Reduction in child and maternal mortality rate is an indicator of improvement in the
delivery of health services. The majority of interviewees said that there was no doctor or
birth attendant available to assist the delivery of their last child. HRFM found out that
50% of interviewees were assisted by their relatives and friends during the delivery of
their last child.152 Around 15.4% of interviewees said doctors or nurses assisted the
delivery of their last child, 14% said that traditional birth attendants or educated birth
attendants assisted the delivery of their last child. Similarly, 9.1% of interviewees stated
that there was no one to help them when their last child was being born. The following
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figure presents the details.153

According to the annual report of MoPH, in the year 1387 (2008/09), there was an
increase of around 5% in the number of trained birth attendants, who offered about 31%
of birth-related services.131 This figure is comparatively different from HRFM findings,
for HRFM data shows that only 14% of interviewees were assisted by trained birth
attendants during the delivery of their last child.

MoPH has considered two standards—distance and population—for building
hospitals and clinics, which are rational and logical. But practice shows that the standard
of distance has, to some extent, not been considered for the construction of health centers,
because HRFM data indicates that about 50% of those who do not use state- or NGO-run
health centers gave physical accessibility as the reason. To some degree, the Ministry has
been successful in the construction of health centers. Of 312 planned clinics, 291 have
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been built and in addition, 54 mobile clinics have been established in 1387 (2008/09).154
Vaccination campaigns have also yielded successes, despite growing insecurity.
Approximately four nationwide campaigns were launched to eradicate polio with each
campaign targeting 7.5 million under-five children. Additionally, vitamin A capsule
vaccination was launched targeting 6.8 million children aged between six months and
five years. It is noteworthy that this program was relatively implemented in insecure
areas like Kandahar and Helmand.155

4.2.1 Maternal Health
The maternal mortality ratio is extremely high in Afghanistan: the most recent
data show 1,800 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births (WHO 2007). Given the
expansion and the utilization of maternal and child health services it has increased
significantly in Afghanistan, albeit not uniformly across the country. Utilization is
positively correlated with wealth status. It is much more difficult for the poor to get to the
health facility; distance is a significant obstacle to seeking care. There is evidence that
health facilities tend to be located closer to better-off households and farther from poor
households.156 Comparing travel time to the nearest health facility using household’s
routine mode of transportation, 13.5 percent of the poorest households live within two
hours of household in the wealthiest quintile. Furthermore, 54.3 percent of households in
the poorest quintile live more than six hours from a health facility, compared with only
3.8 percent of households in the wealthiest quintile.157
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4.2.2 Immunization and distance:
A massive vaccination program led to a marked reduction in confirmed polio
cases. A measles mortality reduction campaign was conducted and reached more than 90
percent of children six months to 12 years of age, and iodized salt has been provided to
300,000 malnourished women and children.158 Despite the impressive economic recovery
and initiation of a development strategy based on sound principles (outlined in the
Government’s National Development Framework), Afghanistan still ranks very poorly on
all social indicators. Based on a 2003 NDF sample survey, infant mortality at 115 per
thousand live births and under-five mortality at 172 per thousand live births are among
the highest in the world. The situation is particularly grim in rural areas where one out of
five children dies before reaching five years of age. The estimated rate of maternal
mortality (1,600 per 100,000 live births) is among the highest in the world. Nine out of
ten births are not taking place in health facilities, and the corresponding figure is even
higher in rural areas. Family planning is largely non-existent. Morbidity rates are
extremely high: 30 percent of children under five years of age were reported to have
diarrhea during the two-week period that preceded the survey and 19% to have suffered
from severe respiratory diseases over the same period. Malnutrition is also a critical
issue. Seventy percent of children do not receive timely complementary feeding (which
could damage their physical and learning capacity). Children living further from a health
facility have lower immunization rates than other children. For example, the
immunization rates for BCG (Bacillus Calmette-Guerin; among children who live more
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than four hours from a health facility is only 60 percent of that of children who live less
than two hours from a facility.159

4.2.3 Reproductive health care and distance:
Care seeking for reproductive health is low in Afghanistan there is more than a 25
percentage point drop in the utilization of skilled birth attendance for women who live
more than six hours from a health facility compared with women who live within two
hours of a facility. Less than 5 percent of women giving birth who live more than six
hours from a health facility have a skilled birth attendant. The relationship between
distance to a health care facility and maternal care is reflected in maternal mortality
ratios, which are extremely high in remote and rural areas. Rural areas, especially remote
ones, have a double problem: rural facilities are less likely to have skilled female health
workers, and women who live in remote areas have more difficulty accessing health
facilities.

4.3 The right to Food:
The right to food means assurance that all people have dignified access to the food
they need. States should increasingly employ their resources to reduce levels of hunger,
food insecurity, and malnutrition. This right comprises four elements, which include
availability, accessibility, adequacy, and sustainability. The concept of food availability
means that food should be provided either directly from production or through
distribution, processing, and market system. This right requires that food should be both
159
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physically and economically accessible, meaning that citizens should be able to easily
access the food they need. On the other hand, the available food should have quality so
that it can meet food needs and that food should be safe and culturally acceptable to all,
with due consideration to their personal status, age, living conditions, job, and gender.
This food should be available not only for the current generation, but for the generations
to come also. The right to food requires the government to help their citizens provide
their food needs by creating a favorable economic, political, and social environment.
Inadequate economic activity is not the only reason for hunger and malnutrition, but these
issues in Afghanistan depend on the ability of farmers to produce adequate food and on
the access of people to livelihood options. In some cases, farms have good agricultural
produce; the major problems could be solved if people can have access to food. This right
is also related to Millennium Development Goal 1, eradication of extreme poverty and
hunger.

4.3.1 Lack of economic power causes malnutrition
Unfortunately, a dilemma the Afghanis face is the lack of economic power to
purchase food items. Food items are available in most Afghan markets, but people do not
have the necessary income to purchase their food in markets. This, of course, varies
geographically. For example, in Central Highlands and Northeast, people not only lack
economic power to purchase food items, but they also cannot physically access food
items in these areas, because there is a limited quantity of food items there. Food security
is a good indicator for poverty in Afghanistan, because food-insecure families were
unable to provide themselves with adequate and nutritious food. HRFM data shows that
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the majority of interviewees regard the creation of job opportunities as their top priority,
followed by drinking water and food. As previously noted, employment and job
opportunities fully depend on income levels and income too can be an indicator of
poverty. HRFM findings reveal that 36% of all interviewees and 63.6% of those who
work make a daily income of less than 50 Afghanis (approximately equivalent to US$1),
19.2% make a daily income of over 50 Afghanis, and 44.8% either did not work or they
were unwilling to answer this question, for their income may be illegal or they may have
no income at all. Some 37% of vulnerable people made an income of less than 50
Afghanis per day and 22% made an income of over 50 Afghanis per day in the past year,
which refers to a 1% decrease in the number of people who make less than 50 Afghanis
per day, but in contrast there is a 3% decrease in the number of people who make a daily
income of over 50 Afghanis.160 Most importantly, there is a 3.8% increase in the number
of people who did not answer this question or were unemployed.161 These indicate that
poverty is spreading in Afghanistan and people’s income levels have been on the decline.

It is difficult to determine other indicators of poverty given the lack of systematic
data.162 Government official statistics say that 44% of Afghan families are food-insecure.
As previously noted, about 35% of families cannot provide their daily caloric needs.163
and 61% of families have poor-quality food, taking into account the diversity of the food
they eat.164 FAO study on the situation of nutrition found out that over 6% of children
160
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under the age of five suffer from acute malnutrition (low ratio of weight to height) and
45-60% of children in the same age group suffer from chronic malnutrition (low ratio of
weight to height).165.However, FAO data shows that there has been improvement in the
situation of children with chronic malnutrition compared with previous years and that the
percentage has fallen from 60 to 50%.166

4.3.2 Other indicators of poverty:
During Human rights Field Monitoring interviews, the two main indicators used
were the type of household income and the level of indebtedness amongst the families
interviewed. Additional factors relating to reintegration of refugees and ongoing
displacement can contribute to an understanding of the situation of the right to an
adequate standard of living and have therefore been included in this analysis.
The main sources of income amongst interviewees were identified as farm labor (31.8%),
with only 13.5% of interviewees reporting a stable source of income. These results are
consistent with the finding of the 2005 Millennium Development Goal Report.167
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It is insufficient to define poverty on the basis of a single quantitative indicator. A
thorough understanding of the nature of poverty and who the poor in Afghanistan are,
should precede the finalization of any development strategy. The findings of this FAO
and HRFM must be considered for a more qualitative definition of poverty and should
guide the development of indicators in order to accurately monitor the impact of the
ANDS on the poor and marginalized.168

4.4 The Right to water
The right to water crucially essential for Afghanistan development
The Afghani people need to have access to adequate, high-quality, and acceptable
water to lead a life of health and dignity. Water sources should be adequately and
continuously available for a person for such purposes as drinking, personal hygiene,
washing, cooking, and family hygiene. Quality of water is also important and water
should be free of any types of pollution and other dangers that threaten the health of
people. In addition, water should be adequate and compatible with World Health
Organisation (WHO) guidelines. Above all, water services and facilities should be made
accessible for all, including the poorest and most isolated groups of people.169 The
Afghan government has pledged under ANDS to reduce by half the ratio of people with
no access to healthy potable water by 2020; 50% of families in Kabul and 30% of
families in other urban areas shall have access to tap water by 2012; 90% of people in
villages shall have access to drinking water; and 50% of people shall have access to
sanitation in villages.
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Water supply projects are ongoing in the 34 provincial capital cities. The
Directorate of Water Supply of Afghanistan, responsible for urban water supply, has been
able to provide healthy water.170 Even though their report exhibits that a majority of
interviewees do not have access to safe drinking water. In the National Development
Strategy, the government should make reference to international guidelines on quality
and accessibility of water171 in order to define indicator and monitor progress, and it
should prioritize access to safe drinking water in both rural and urban areas. The
Commission urges the Government to take all necessary steps for consultation with
relevant institutions in the drafting of the new legislation on water, with a view to
ensuring that the law incorporates a rights-based approach to water regulation.
Afghanistan Directorate Water supply have noted that an average 30% of urban wellers
produced 15,000 cubic meters of healthy water per day in Kabul and around 30,000 at the
national level, but it has now raised this to the level of 120,000 cubic meters of healthy
water.172 Previously 65 to 70% of produced healthy water was wasted due to a limited
water supply grid. Data indicates that the Directorate currently has the capacity to
produce 160,000 cubic meters of healthy water.

According to an assessment by the Directorate of Water Supply, of all provinces,
Herat (95%) has the highest level of access to healthy water and Kandahar and Mazar-eSharif have the lowest levels (less than 16%). Kabul has the gravest problem in ensuring
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the right to water. Given the congestion of population and lack of a sewage system in this
city, the absolute majority of underground water sources are contaminated and unsafe.
About 70% of interviewees do not have access to healthy water and use wells that are not
safely covered. The open sewage system is extremely worrisome as it pollutes water
wells.173 HRFM data shows that 33.7% of people use unhealthy, unclean water.

The Directorate of Water Supply says it needs US$750m to complete an urban
water supply grid.174 Currently, a water supply grid exists in 17 major cities and only
30% of interviewees use tap water. But HRFM data shows that 7.5% of interviewees
stand in queue for over an hour to get water. The Head of the Directorate criticized the
government and international donors for their inattention to the development of a water
supply grid and added that the Directorate faces an inadequate budget and low capacity.

It is difficult to access water in rural areas given the country’s successive
droughts. In HRFM, 23.9% of interviewees stated that there are not enough water wells,
4.4% stated that there are repeated water cuts, 3.5% stated that water wells are dry, 2.3%
stated that water wells are destroyed, and 4.2% stated that well water is saline.

Rural dwellers are also suffering from the long distance of water sources.
According to HRFM, 25.7% of interviewees stated they have to walk over 15 minutes
one way to reach a usable water source, 8.0% (967 people) stated they have to walk over
an hour one way to reach a usable water source. Although the Water Supply Department
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of Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MoRRD) said it did not have
accurate information in this respect, it also added that some people have to traverse a
distance of around two hours one way to reach water sources.175 In addition, HRFM
found out that approximately 62.7% of interviewees have problems in providing water
for family use and 2.3% stated that they had to buy water.

Most water sources are open and there is no assurance of their safety. Open water
sources are, especially in rural areas, used jointly by humans and animals. HRFM data
shows that 20.4% of water sources are jointly used by humans and animals. The
Department of Water Supply, Hygienic Education, and Environmental Sanitation of
MoRRD has been able to dig 11,824 wells and 72 water supply grids in villages since
(2002/03).176 According to the Head of the Department, so far 31% of rural people have
access to healthy potable water and 90% of rural people are expected to have access to
drinking water by 2013. Hygienic and sanitary education is important as most people lack
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such an education. The aforesaid department has been able to present awareness- raising
program to only 1.4 million people since (2002/03), while Afghanistan is second after
Sudan to have the highest number of cases of water-borne diarrhea.

Water supply projects are administered by MoRRD and executed by the private
sector. According to MoRRD’s Department of Water Supply, Hygienic Education, and
Environment Sanitation, insecurity, lack of coordination, a weak private sector, and long
bureaucratic procedures are the main challenges facing the development of the country’s
water supply grid. Successive droughts
have rendered many water wells built by
the Directorate and other institutions dry
and unusable. The Directorate said that
assessment has begun, but it estimates that
almost 30% of water wells have gone
dry.177

5. Development: Situation Analysis
Afghanistan had made progress since December 2001 in the aftermath of a
generation of conflict that left the country devastated, but recent upsurge in violence has
stalled and in some areas reversed progress. While the gross domestic product has grown
steadily, to $12,850 million in 2008, the 24 per cent inflation rate places an increasing
burden on the poor. Growing insecurity and the recurrence of violence affect service
177
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delivery, accessibility, and private-sector development and employment, and causes
population displacement. Anti-government elements, combined with factional, tribal and
community conflicts, all contribute to instability. Weak rule of law, corruption, narcotrafficking and an inability to protect the civilian population in many areas, and their
basic human rights remain a major cause for concern. The most affected tend to be the
poor and vulnerable, particularly the women. With a female literacy rate of a mere 14 per
cent, Afghan women face formidable challenges. Gender based violence is very high and
access to justice as well as livelihood opportunities is severely limited for women. At the
same time, humanitarian space is being squeezed, with over 30 per cent of the territory
inaccessible to UN, implementing partners and even Government service providers.
Humanitarian aid is being increasingly met by military based actors causing confusion in
perception in the minds of the people.

The human development indicator for Afghanistan is not available, but other
indicators depict the challenge: a 42.9-year life expectancy (2005 data). The under-five
mortality rate – 191 per 1,000 live births – shows modest improvement, as does the infant
mortality rate, down to 129 per 1,000 live births, but both are among the highest in the
world. While the adult literacy rate is 28 per cent – one of the lowest in the world –
primary completion rates are gradually improving (from 25 per cent to 38 per cent since
2005). The most significant improvement has been witnessed in the maternal mortality
rate, cut in half from a staggering 1,600 to 800 per 100,000 births over the past few years.
In critical Millennium Development Goals, such as extreme poverty and hunger, the trend
is regressing: 42 per cent of population lives below the poverty line, as compared to 33
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per cent in 2005. The poorest now comprises 10.5 percent of the population, as compared
to 9.3 per cent in 2005, and 39 per cent of the population receive less than the minimum
level of dietary energy consumption, compared to 30 per cent in 2005. Despite the efforts
of the international community and the enormous resources invested, human
development is showing improvement only in the health and education indicators.

The private sector and civil society are fragile, though economic growth is stable.
In 2008, 89 per cent of the total national budget was funded from external sources. While
the development budget is still funded entirely by international donors, only 40 per cent
of the operational budget is mobilized locally. This underlines the need for the
international community to remain engaged in supporting Afghanistan. The international
community, increasingly coordinated by the United Nations, serves as an important pillar
of support to the Afghan people in this transition.

Significant challenges remain. Overall, the analysis shows that security,
governance and human development challenges are inextricably linked, and long-term
investments targeting the poorest will be required to ensure that the human development
trajectory of the country is in the right direction. The Afghanistan national development
strategy has been formulated and adopted. It projects “a vision of a peaceful, stable and
prosperous Afghanistan, based on the principles of Islam, outlining the priorities of the
Government in terms of security, governance, development and humanitarian
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domains”.178 The Government, in consultation with the international community, has
developed a strategic plan for its implementation and is moving forward with it.

6. Past cooperation and lessons learned
Since early 2002 the UNDP program in Afghanistan has supported stabilization,
state- building, governance and development, so far disbursing in the region of $1.5
billion. UNDP support, in partnership with the government, the United Nations system,
the donor community and other development stakeholders, has contributed to the
emergency Loya Jirga; adoption of the Constitution; presidential, parliamentary and
provincial council elections; institutional development through capacity-building to the
legislature, the judicial and executive arms of the state, and key ministries, government
agencies and commissions at the national and sub national levels. UNDP has played a
key role in the management of the Law and Order Trust Fund, which supports the
Government in developing and maintaining the national police force and in efforts to
stabilize the internal security environment. Like many other strategic UNDP programs in
Afghanistan, the Trust Fund has benefited, and continues to benefit, from the very active
support of donors. Major demobilization, disarmament and rehabilitation and area-based
livelihoods and reconstruction programs have taken place nationwide. UNDP also
supported the formulation of the first ever, Millennium Development Goals-based
Afghanistan national development strategy, and the Government is institutionalizing and
promoting its implementation.
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The new country program builds on the lessons from the assessment of
development results for the period 2002-2007, which was recently completed by the
UNDP Evaluation Office. The assessment pointed to the need for UNDP to strengthen its
coherence and provide more substantive programs in the next phase of assistance,
building on the new direction adopted in 2005. It recommended that UNDP adopt a more
direct presence outside Kabul to enhance the outreach of its programs to ordinary
Afghans. While this has to be balanced with security concerns, it is a key objective in this
new country program, as an emphasis on secure provinces in the past cycle undermined
development for large segments of the population. UNDP invested heavily in central
institutional development; however, the positive impact of the lives of Afghans was
limited, and more must be done to improve state-society relationships, trust and
confidence. To strengthen accountability, the assessment recommended improved
reporting of development results from interventions and better integration of UNDP
programs and coordination with UNAMA and the United Nations system as a whole. It
noted that the donor practice of paying government salaries and supplements and creating
externally funded implementation units affected sustainability.

The new country program takes these lessons and recommendations into account
and will build on the foundations laid during the last cycle. It will focus on institutionbuilding and will support ongoing efforts to systematically build capacities within the
government and civil society and to deepen the functioning of transparent and
accountable democratic governance. Emphasis will be increasingly placed on sub-
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national governance, a pro-poor private sector, and livelihood development programs
aimed towards the most vulnerable groups.179

VI Summary and Conclusion
In this research I intended to identify the impediments of development and
state building and how to overcome the development and stability roadblocks that
Afghanistan faces today. The failures and successes of Afghanistan’s development
argued in this paper could be summarized as such; the economic activity in Afghanistan
turned to double-digit growth rates in 2007 as a consequence of both a recovering in the
agriculture sector and after the 2006 drought and a large demand impulse based on donor
financed spending and drug money. Growth in the medium and long term is expected to
decline, and will depend on improvement on governance and a successful integration into
the world economy. Private sector investment has still not recuperated from peak levels
in 2005. Pressured to increase revenues, the government is taking the wrong steps by
overtaxing the formal sector (while offering no public goods in exchange) and increasing
tax uncertainty especially to large taxpayers, instead of broadening the tax structure by
means of increasing investment and formalizing part of the legal but informal economy.
We then moved to define a proper definition that suits Afghanistan’s
development. In the case of Afghanistan, development consists of citizens having
economic and social rights in their homeland. The government should do more than just
acknowledge that the human rights obligations in the international treaties to which
Afghanistan is a state party are an applicable legal framework for its National
179
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Development Strategy and that the strategy must not be in violation of these obligations.
The government needs to explicitly recognize that the National Development Strategy is
a step towards the full realization of rights recognized in international human rights
instruments. Further, we discussed and analyzed the economic reconstruction and public
health context in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2010. The country has very low quantity and
a poor quality of human capital, however, there is no evidence this is a constraining
factor for the private sector at the present time. In addition to this, geographical
challenges, including being landlocked and the challenges that are imposed for Afghan
exports, as they must transit into neighboring countries, add to the list of constraining
issues. Geography combined with the lack of adequate infrastructure in particular related
to the agribusiness (transportation, irrigation, value-chain links) and other potentially
exporting sectors, appear to be the second most binding constraint to economic activity,
and it is the most important challenge for the country in the long-term perspective.
Afghanistan still today has a basic agricultural and manufacturing infrastructure
that was destroyed and has not fully recuperated; economic and political institutions have
been weakened; and the domestic and international markets for Afghanistan’s food
supplies, livestock, and manufactured good have been disrupted or lost. Ethnic and
regional tensions plague a fragmented society, and human capital has deteriorated from
years of interrupted health and education and training, and from the steady decline in
health and social services.
Afghanistan’s Health sector has made the most progress. But with the health
sector growth and the market share recovery, these elements of growth suggest that there
is still a possibility to overcome the infrastructure limitation. In order to overcome these

91

limitations, Afghanistan’s government must implement the rule of law on its state.
According to the Human Development Index, Afghanistan is the second least developed
country in the world. Goals that Afghanistan must achieve: The National Priority
Programs Priority program mentions six initial goals that Afghanistan must reach: (i) to
unite Government, donors, the private sector, NGOs, and civil society around national
policies; (ii) to create efficiency, accountability, and transparency in public spending; (iii)
to enable resources to be allocated for large national programs, as opposed to smaller and
less efficient projects; (iv) to enhance the leadership and ownership of Government and
Ministries in the reconstruction process; and (v) to enhance provincial equity in national
program execution180.
Governance systems in Afghanistan are still weak and state’s authority
barely extends beyond the capital. As you’ve read in this research paper these issues are
the reason why Afghanistan is so dependent on the aid of donor government,
international aid agencies, international organizations and NGOs to help it reach the
developmental change beyond the capital in order to create a united growth across the
country. These organizations are not to overlook opportunities, repeat mistakes, and
ignore threats and complexities, and waste resources.
We then have evaluated potential routes to improve the distorted
reconstruction process in Afghanistan, by focusing on critical sociocultural aspects of
Afghan society. To start with, the Afghan government and international development
agencies must conduct a closer study of what people on the ground actually desire and
need, and in what priority they rank those needs. If the Kabul-based government and
countless international aid agencies carry on with their own insular notions of what is
DFID Understanding Afghanistan, Report 2010.
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important for Afghanistan’s reconstruction without consulting its heterogeneous peoples,
rebuilding the country will be an impossible project—out of touch with the practical
needs and desires of people on the ground, and constantly battling a stubborn insurgency
that is growing which restricts the reconstruction process. Rather, for a sustainable peace
to take root in Afghanistan again, reconstruction agencies must, as a start, substantially
increase their knowledge and understanding of the diverse legal cultures and systems of
law that operate, de facto, on the ground in Afghanistan. Meanwhile there is an urgent
need for outside forces to respect local law that resonates with the lives of its people,
however unfamiliar to the foreign eye. Beyond this, the same international forces now
controlling reconstruction must relinquish the notions that creating an Afghanistan in a
Western secular-liberal society’s self-image, is nearly impossible. The local socio-legal
actors on the ground must take into consideration: the responsibility of building stable
and self-supporting civil institutions on the foundation of their own unique Afghani local
histories and modes of conflict resolution, a substantial portion of which is rooted in
Islamic law.

Furthermore, the findings of the UNDP and Afghanistan National Development
Strategy, analysis remind us of how fragile the Afghan economy is and that much more
should be done in order to put the country on a path for sustainable development. There
are severe deficiencies in every aspect covered by the UNDP and ANDS framework,
which all indicate that Afghanistan economy has limited access to formal finance (mostly
international aid) and most investments are international organization and it needs more
help. On the other hand when analyzing the financial market, we can conclude that due to
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poor strategic planning and not lack of domestic savings, the state has hard time
maintaining a stable economy. Banks are not providing credit to the private sector and
limit their activities to basic services focused on urban areas, foreign and donor
community. This is in part due to severe property rights and rule enforcement issues.

In order to attain the ideal result, it is important to work towards creating a robust
rule of law, practice and atmosphere; doing so is essential if Afghanistan seeks to revive
its economy and provide hope and opportunity to its long-battered constituents.
Additionally there’s a need to curb corruption of the Karzai Government but also across
different spheres, economical political, police and the military. In order to accomplish the
goal set by the developmental multinational institutions and the Afghani government
itself, Afghanistan needs to work on different levels simultaneously and create structures
for cooperation among the various spheres of influence by not only focusing on a
hierarchical structure of top to bottom commandeering, but also lateral cooperation
among all levels of government and society. In my research I identified the success and
failures of Afghanistan’s development and the cause and effect of each success or failure,
and drew conclusions of what steps need to be taken in order to plan a better future for
Afghanistan.
I was able to show where Afghanistan’s development has flourished, mostly
in the health and economic areas, but development has not been able to expand to other
areas such as security and human rights, these areas are still very weak and need
improvement. Further development depends on security, and how to build stability within
Afghanistan. Is that a responsibility that the United Nations or the United States wants to
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be in charge of is NATO going to take the lead, or is NATO better off leaving this task to
Afghanistan’s neighboring states, for the region to settle its own issues independently?
Ultimately, Afghanistan’s history would teach us, however, that this is not the first time
foreign powers underestimated the resilience of indigenous people in this war-torn
country. The challenges in the future remains as to whether future U.S. administrations,
global development agencies, and other international actors will heed such lessons in
time to prevent a repeat of the past’s catastrophic chain of events. Among many some
policy recommendation that most growth strategy organizations make are: most urgent
reforms in Afghanistan should focus the energy and political and human capital, and
donors support in both technical capacity and funding on (i) further reforming the tax
collection process and agents, and reducing the “nuisance” taxes and multiplicity of fees;
(ii) addressing the widespread corruption, (iii) focusing investments in infrastructure
projects directly related to increase competitiveness in the tradable sector, and (iv)
securing trade facilitation and transit rights in the region to effectively exploit the
regional and world market181.

To these 4 major points, it is also crucial to work toward creating a robust practice
of the rule of law, creating security and focusing on effective development strategies.
Doing so is essential if Afghanistan seeks to revive its economy and provide hope and
opportunity to its long-battered constituents. In order to accomplish the goal set by
multinational institutions, NGOs and the Afghani government, coordination and
cooperation must be done on multiple levels between these entities and one coordination
entity must be formed that will be responsible and accountable for development.
181

DFID Understanding Afghanistan, Report 2010
95

Bibliography
Rashid. Ahmad, Descent into chaos: The U.S and the disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan,
and Central Asia: New York: Penguin Books, 2009.
Ghani, Ashraf, Lockhart Clare, Fixing Failed States, A Framework For Rebuilding A
Fractured World: Oxford University Press,2009.
Fukuyama, F. ed. Michele A. Flournoy, Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2006
Fukuyama, F. State-Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century.
London: Profile Books, 2004
World Bank, Afghanistan State Building, Sustaining Growth, and Reducing Poverty A
Country Economic Report, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit
South Asia Region September 9, 2004
Rennie, Ruth. State building, security, and social change in Afghanistan, Reflections on a
Survey of the Afghan People, The Asia Foundation: Kabul, Afghanistan.2008
Their, Alexander. Chopra, Jarat. The Road Ahead , Political and institutional
reconstruction of Afghanistan, Third World Quarterly, Vol 23, No 5, p. 897, 2002
Ayub, Fatima. Kouvo, Sari, Righting the course? Humanitarian intervention, the war on
terror and the future of Afghanistan, International Affairs, 84:4, 2000
Report of the High-level panel set up by UN secretary-general, Threats, Challenges and
Changes, December 2004.
Sau, Ranjit, Reconstruction of Afghanistan into a Modern Nation, Economic and Political
Weekly, Vol. 37, No.2 ,Jan.12-18, 2002
John D. Montgomery, Dennis A. Rondinelli Beyond Reconstruction in Afghanistan:
Lessons from Development Experience, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2004
Shahrani, M.Nazif. The future of the state and the structure of community governance in
Afghanistan. In W.Maley, ed. Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban.
New York: NYU Press, 1998.
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Decentralised Governance for
Development: A Combined Practice Note on Decentralisation, Local Governance and
Urban/ Rural Development: New York: UNPD, 2004.
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Afghanistan National Human
Development Report. Kabul: UNDP, 2007.
96

World Bank. Afghanistan: State Building, Sustaining Growth, and Reducing Poverty.
Washington, DC: World Bank, 2004.
World Bank. Service Delivery and Governance at the Sub-National level in Afghanistan.
Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007.
Nixon, H. Aiding the State? International Assistance and the State-building Paradox in
Afghanistan. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2008.
Nixon, H and Ponzio, R. Building Democracy in Afghanistan: The State-building Agenda
and International Engagement. International Peacekeeping 14:1, 2007.
Nixon, H. The Changing Face of Community Governance? Community Development
Councils in Afghanistan. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit 2008.
Ottaway, M. Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States. In J. Milliken. State
Failure, Collapse and Reconstruction. Oxford: Blackwell, 2003.
Pascual, Carlos. Building Capacity for Stabilization and Reconstruction. Testimony for
House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. January 29, 2008
Rennie, Ruth, ed. State Building, Security, and Social Change in Afghanistan: Reflections
on a Survey of the Afghan People. The Asia Foundation. Kabul, 2008.
Afghanistan State Building, Sustaining Growth, and Reducing Poverty A Country
Economic Report, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit South Asia
Region September 9, 2004, Report No. 29551-AF, Document of the World Bank.
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ,The World Bank, Doing
Business 2010: Reforming through Difficult Times, 2010.
UNDP Afghanistan State-Building & Government Support Program, Afghanistan
Country Office December 2008.
Country Cooperation Strategy, For WHO and Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan, Distribution limited to CCS Team Members and PME, WHO EMRO, 2005
to 2009,
< www.emro.who.int/afghanistan/PDF/CCS_2005.pdf >
Nasreen Ghufran, Afghanistan in 2005: The Challenges of Reconstruction, Asian Survey,
Vol. 46, No 1 (Jan. – Feb. 2006). http://www.jastor.org/stable/4497154
(Accessed Feb 23, 2010)
Kathy Gannon, Afghanistan Unbound Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No 3 (May – Jun. 2004).
http://jstor.org/stable/20033974 (Accessed Feb 23, 2010)
97

Jonathan Goodhand, Aiding Violence or Building Peace? The Role of International Aid in
Afghanistan, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 5, Reconstruction War- Torn Societies:
Afghanistan, Oct 2002, http://www.jastor.org/stable/3993391 (Accessed Feb 23, 2010)
Sultan Barakat, Setting the scene for Afghanistan’s Reconstruction: The challenges and
Critical Dilemmas, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 23, No 5, Reconstruction War Torn
Societies: Afghanistan, Oct, 2002, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3993389 (Accessed Feb
23, 2010)
Amin Saikal, Afghanistan’s Transition: ISAF’S Stabilization role, Third World Quarterly,
Vol. 27, No. 3, 2006, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3993398 (Accessed, Feb 23, 2010)
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The World Bank, Doing
Business in Afghanistan, 2010, the Office of the Publisher: The World Bank,
Washington, 2010
<http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/FPDKM/Doing%20Business/Documents/Profile
s/Country/DB11/AFG.pdf > (Accessed, Apr 28, 2011)
United Nations Development Program, Afghanistan Country Office, UNDP Afghanistan
State-Building & Government Support Program, December 2008, <
http://www.undp.org.af/publications/KeyDocuments/Factsheets/sbgs/FactSheetSBGSDec08.pdf > (Accessed, Apr 28, 2011)

98

